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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three essays on accounting conservatism, corporate social 
responsibility, and corporate governance. The first essay examines the influence of 
accounting conservatism on trade credit, particularly under the background of the recent 
global financial crisis. The second essay investigates whether suppliers value customer firms’ 
corporate social responsibility activities by exploring the influence of customer firms’ social 
performance on trade credit. The third essay examines how the heterogeneous credit crunch 
shock that took place during the recent global financial crisis moderated the effectiveness of 
corporate governance on deterring expropriation by controlling shareholders and improving 
firm performance.
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Introduction 
 
This thesis addresses three topics: accounting conservatism, corporate social 
responsibility, and corporate governance. These three topics are closely related both 
theoretically and empirically. In chapter one, I examine the effect of accounting conservatism 
on trade credit. In chapter two, I investigate whether suppliers value socially responsible 
customers. These first two chapters explore research questions from the perspective of 
supplier-customer relationship. In chapter three, I examine the moderating role of a 
heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the effectiveness of corporate governance. Both 
chapter three and chapter one employ the credit crunch shock that took place during the 
recent global financial crisis as the research background. 
In chapter one, “Accounting conservatism and trade credit”, I investigate the impact of 
accounting conservatism on trade credit. In the recent financial crisis, banks and financial 
institutions became more prudent, and credit supply was significantly reduced. I explore the 
credit crunch during the crisis to reduce endogeneity concerns. I find that a firm with less 
conservative financial reporting is more likely to use trade credit during the crisis. Since 
previous literature finds less conservative firms obtain less debt financing during the crisis, 
the above finding implies that suppliers are different from financial stakeholders when 
providing credit. Further analysis shows that suppliers increase trade credit provision to less 
conservative customer firms because of suppliers’ advantage in acquire customers’ 
information through intermediate inputs transactions and suppliers’ advantage in liquidating 
intermediate inputs. Taken together, the results suggest that, compared to financial 
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stakeholders, suppliers are more tolerant to customer firms’ less conservative financial 
reporting. 
In chapter two, “Do suppliers value socially responsible customers?” (Coauthored with 
JUAN M. GARCÍA LARA and JOSEP A. TRIBÓ), we examine suppliers’ viewpoints on customer 
firms’ socially responsible activities. We address the above question by exploring the 
influence of customer firms’ social performance on trade credit. We find that socially 
responsible customers are more likely to receive trade credit from suppliers, implying that 
suppliers value customer firms’ socially responsible activities. We further check the 
underlying mechanisms by exploring the moderating role of customer industries’ consumer 
perception and suppliers’ risk exposure in the customer-supplier relationship. To reduce 
endogeneity concerns, we employ instrumental variable regressions and propensity score 
matching. Overall, our findings suggest that, suppliers value socially responsible customers, 
and they are willing to provide trade credit to the customers with good social performance. 
In chapter three, “Heterogeneous Credit Crunch Shock and the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Governance” (coauthored with MARÍA GUTIÉRREZ), we examine how the 
heterogeneous credit crunch shock during the global financial crisis influences the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. We theoretically illustrate that, with a firm being 
exposed to severer adverse shock, the controlling shareholder has higher incentive to 
expropriate minority shareholders, thus corporate governance plays a more significant role in 
deterring expropriation and improving firm performance. We test the above hypothesis using 
the sample of Chinese non-financial firms during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The 
financial crisis induced credit crunch shock to Chinese economy, and the firms that depend 
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more on external finance were more severely influenced. We find that, when a firm is 
exposed to severer credit crunch shock, the controlling shareholder’s excess voting rights are 
associated with worse firm performance, and corporate governance are more effective in 
improving firm performance. Furthermore, the above relation is more pronounced when the 
controlling shareholder is more sensitive to the adverse shock. Overall, the above findings 
indicate that severe credit crunch shocks stimulate the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
In sum, this thesis contributes to the academic discussions on accounting conservatism, 
corporate social responsibility, and corporate governance. Chapter one shows the contracting 
role of accounting conservatism on trade credit provision, chapter two demonstrates the 
suppliers’ viewpoints on customer firms’ corporate social responsibility activities, and chapter 
three presents the moderating role of a heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance.
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1. Accounting Conservatism and Trade Credit 
1.1 Introduction 
Trade credit is an important source of financing, and it provides, especially, short term 
liquidity (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Fisman and Love, 2003; Klapper et al., 2012). Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) report that trade credit accounts for 15% of total assets in U.S. nonfinancial 
firms, while current debt accounts for just 7.4%. During the credit crunch of 2007-2008 
global financial crisis, suppliers actively worked as liquidity providers by offering trade 
credit to customer firms (Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). However, the 
influence of a firm’s accounting practice on its use of trade credit is relatively unexplored. It 
is unclear whether and how suppliers evaluate customer firms’ accounting practices when 
offering trade credit. 
In this paper, I investigate the effect of accounting conservatism on trade credit under 
the background of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, I examine whether a 
firm with less conservative financial reporting is more likely to use trade credit as an 
alternative source of financing during the crisis. Conditional conservatism in accounting 
practices implies more timely recognition of bad news than good news (Basu, 1997).1
During the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, banks and other debt providers were 
extremely prudent when providing credit (Campello et al., 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 
2010; Iyer et al., 2013). In contrast, the suppliers with high pre-crisis liquidity levels actively 
provided trade credit to their customer firms during the crisis (Garcia-Appendini and 
 Since 
conditionally conservative financing reporting provides more downside information, it 
facilitates efficient debt contracting (Watts, 2003). Previous studies find that a firm with more 
conservative financial reporting obtains more access to debt financing and with better 
conditions (Ahmed et al, 2002; Zhang, 2008; Haw et al., 2014; García Lara et al., 2016).  
                                                             
1 The accounting conservatism practice discussed in this study is restricted to conditional conservatism. Throughout the 
paper, both of the terms conservatism and accounting conservatism refer to conditional conservatism. 
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Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). Under the credit crunch shock, a firm with less conservative 
financial reporting is less likely to obtain debt financing, and it is expected to demand for 
more trade credit as an alternative source of financing.  
In contrast, a firm with more conservative financial reporting can obtain more debt 
financing. Even if suppliers offer trade credit to it, the customer firm can repay earlier and 
take advantage of the early payment discount (Ng et al., 1999). Furthermore, by using loan or 
public bond, the firm can reduce tax expenses via the tax shield of debt (Heider and 
Ljungqvist, 2015; Faulkender and Smith, 2016). Therefore, the more conservative firms have 
less demand for trade credit. 
Why are suppliers willing to offer trade credit to less conservative customer firms? First, 
suppliers can acquire customer firms’ information through intermediate inputs transactions 
(Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Customer firms’ repayment of trade 
credit also directly transfers information to suppliers (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and 
Ellingsen, 2004; Aktas et al., 2012). In this sense, a supplier can still obtain some information 
about its customer firm even if the customer conducts less conservative financial reporting. 
Furthermore, intermediate inputs can work as collateral for trade credit, suppliers are exposed 
to less default risk (Mian and Smith, 1992; Giannetti et al., 2011). 
Following Duchin et al. (2010) and Balakrishnan et al. (2016), I employ a 
Difference-in-Difference (DiD) research design based on the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis. The trade credit before and after the onset of the crisis is set to be a function of 
accounting conservatism. During the crisis, firms are expected to use more trade credit in 
general, but the less conservative firms are expected to use more trade credit than the more 
conservative firms. 
The sample includes all the U.S. incorporated nonfinancial firms in Compustat, with 
fiscal quarter ending between July 2006 and June 2008, in which the period from July 2007 
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to June 2008 is defined as the post-crisis period. I measure a firm’s accounting conservatism 
using the C_Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009). To mitigate measurement error, I 
use the three-year average of C_Score prior to the financial crisis, following García Lara et al. 
(2016). 
Consistent with the predictions, I find that, compared to firms with more conservative 
financial reporting, the firms with less conservative financial reporting use more trade credit 
during the crisis. I also test the cross-sectional variations of the main hypothesis based on the 
analysis of several subsamples. The effect of accounting conservatism on trade credit is more 
pronounced when suppliers can acquire more information about their customers through 
intermediate inputs transaction, when customers’ inputs are easier to liquidate, or when 
customers faces more financing frictions.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways: First, I extend the literature on 
the debt contracting benefits of accounting conservatism. Previous studies find accounting 
conservatism is associated with various rewards in the debt market, such as higher credit 
ratings (Ahmed et al., 2002), lower interest rates (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008; Haw et 
al., 2014), and more access to debt financing (Balakrishnan et al., 2016; García Lara et al., 
2016). I show that the less conservative firms are more likely to use trade credit as an 
alternative source of financing. 
Second, this paper complements previous studies on the link between accounting 
conservatism and supplier-customer relations. Hui et al. (2012) argue that, to evaluate 
customers’ short-term trading obligation and long-term financial viability, suppliers prefer 
customers that report conservatively. They find that suppliers with more bargaining power 
demand (and enforce) more conservative financial reporting to their customers. I show that, 
compared to banks or other debtholders, suppliers are more tolerant to customer firms’ less 
conservative financial reporting. When less conservative customers cannot obtain debt 
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financing from banks or public bonds, they can still receive trade credit from suppliers.  
Third, I add to a growing stream of literature on financial reporting during the global 
financial crisis. Balakrishnan et al. (2016) examine the effect of accounting conservatism on 
corporate investment during the financial crisis. They find that firms with less conservative 
financial reporting experience a sharper decline in investment during the crisis. I explore the 
credit crunch during the crisis, and examine the influence of accounting conservatism on 
trade credit. Therefore, it further advances our understanding on the role of financial 
reporting during the financial crisis. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the link between 
accounting conservatism and trade credit, and proposes empirical predictions. Section 3 
describes the sample and the research design. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. 
Section 5 shows the additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
1.2 Hypotheses development 
In this section, I provide arguments for why less conservative firms are more likely to 
use trade credit as an alternative source of financing. The trade credit used by a customer firm 
is jointly determined by the customer firm and its suppliers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Klapper et al., 2012). I first provide arguments supporting the idea that the less conservative 
firms demand more trade credit than the more conservative ones. Then I discuss why 
suppliers are willing to provide trade credit to these less conservative customers. 
1.2.1 Conservatism and customers’ demand for trade credit 
Previous literature finds that firms with more conservative financial reporting obtain 
more debt financing and with better conditions (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008; Haw 
et al., 2014; Balakrishnan et al., 2016; García Lara et al., 2016). Compared to more 
conservative firms, less conservative firms are less likely to obtain access to debt financing, 
and they have to search for alternative financing sources.  
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Trade credit could be an alternative for these firms to obtain short-term liquidity. 
Previous literature finds that, when a firm cannot obtain debt financing because of credit 
rationing or other financing frictions, it tends to use more trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997). In the economies with less developed financial markets or during the financial crisis, 
trade credit acts as a substitute for bank credit (Fisman and Love, 2003; Love et al., 2007; 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). Therefore, less conservative firms have 
more demand for trade credit. 
In contrast, more conservative firms can easily obtain debt financing from banks or other 
debt providers (Ahmed et al, 2002; Zhang, 2008; Haw et al., 2014). Most trade credit contract 
is accompanied with early payment discount, and, to use trade credit, the more conservative 
firms need to incur significant opportunity cost. Ng et al. (1999) introduce a classical trade 
credit agreement, in which a 2% discount is offered if the customer repays within 10 days, 
while full price is charged for repayment within 30 days. If a customer firm does not repay 
within 10 days, it will lose the opportunity to get a discount, and the annualized (implicit) 
interest rate for trade credit is as high as 43.9%.2
Furthermore, different from the implicit cost of trade credit, the interest expenses of debt 
financing are deductible from taxable income. Therefore, debt financing are widely used as 
tax shield (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Faulkender and Smith, 2016). Heider and 
Ljungqvist (2015) find that firms increase its leverage and issue more debt as a response to 
tax increase. Since accounting conservatism facilitates efficient debt contracting, more 
conservative firms can issue debt with better conditions, they are expected to use more debt 
financing to reduce tax expenses. Consequently, these more conservative firms will have less 
 Since more conservative firms can obtain 
access to debt financing with better conditions, it is a better choice for them to repay earlier to 
receive early payment discount.  
                                                             
2 It can be calculated as 360/( 30 10)100/(100 2)] 1−− − . 
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demand for trade credit, and they are more likely to repay suppliers before the early payment 
discounts expire. 
Overall, I expect that a customer firm’s demand for trade credit is negatively related to 
its accounting conservatism. A firm with less conservative financial reporting demands more 
trade credit as financing substitutes, whereas a firm with more conservative financial 
reporting has less demand for trade credit. 
1.2.2 Are suppliers willing to provide trade credit to the less conservative customer firms? 
Suppliers have an information advantage over debt holders or banks because they can 
acquire information through intermediate inputs transactions (Biais and Gollier, 1997; 
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that suppliers can easily 
evaluate, monitor, and control the credit risk of customers. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) 
attribute the information advantage of suppliers to intermediate inputs transactions. Suppliers 
can observe the credit-worthiness of customers through intermediate inputs transactions, 
while other debt holders or banks have to incur additional monitoring cost. Therefore, 
suppliers rely less on conservative financial reporting to evaluate customer firms. 
The use of trade credit can also directly transfer customers’ information to suppliers. 
Since trade credit usually has short maturity (Ng et al., 1999; Klapper et al., 2012), the 
credit-worthiness of a customer can easily be observed by its suppliers once the customer 
cannot repay trade credit on time. Aktas et al. (2012) even argue that the use of trade credit 
not only provide information to suppliers, but also reduce the information asymmetry 
between firms and outside investors. Therefore, trade credit itself is an effective way to 
acquire information. By offering trade credit to less conservative customers, suppliers can be 
rewarded with more information. 
Furthermore, the intermediate inputs can work as collateral for trade credit, reducing 
suppliers’ exposure to potential default risk. In the case of bankruptcy, suppliers can liquidate 
10 
 
customer firms’ intermediate inputs to cover trade credit. It is worth to note that, suppliers 
have advantage in liquidating intermediate inputs since they have professional expertise on 
the intermediate inputs market (Mian and Smith, 1992; Giannetti et al., 2011), which further 
reduces suppliers’ exposure to default risk. In contrast, not all the bank loans or public debts 
are issued with collateral. Even if some of them are tied to collateral, banks or other debt 
holders have to incur significant costs to liquidate the collateral. 
The above arguments indicate that, different from banks or debt holders, suppliers are 
tolerant to customer firms’ less conservative financial reporting. On the one hand, suppliers 
can acquire customer firms’ information through intermediate inputs transaction and trade 
credit repayment. On the other hand, suppliers have advantages in liquidating intermediate 
inputs even if customer firms default. Therefore, when customer firms demand for trade 
credit as an alternative financing source, suppliers are willing to offer trade credit to customer 
firms, even if the customers conduct less conservative financial reporting.  
However, it does not mean that suppliers prefer less conservative customer firms. As 
documented by Hui et al. (2012), customer firms’ conditional conservative financing 
reporting provides suppliers timely downside information. When a supplier has greater 
bargaining power, it enforces customer firms to report conservatively. 
1.2.3 Credit crunch and trade credit during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
During the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, credit supply significantly reduce 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Campello et al., 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Iyer et al., 2013). 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show the new loans to large borrowers fall by 47% during 
the crisis. Many firms have to abandon attractive investments because of liquidity shortage 
(Campello et al., 2010). Credit supply decreases even more for smaller firms or firms with 
weaker banking relationship, indicating that banks become more prudent during the financial 
crisis (Iyer et al., 2013). 
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In contrast to bank credit crunch, trade credit significantly increases during the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis. Previous theoretical studies show that suppliers provide 
more trade credit to customers when the latter experience temporary liquidity shock (Wilner, 
2000; Cuñat, 2007). Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) find the suppliers with 
higher liquidity level offer more trade credit to customer firms during the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis. Similar phenomenon also occurs in other financial crises. For instance, Love 
et al. (2007) examine the financial crises in Mexico and Southeast Asia in 1990s, they also 
find trade credit significantly increases during these crises.  
The credit crunch shock and increase of trade credit during the crisis provides a good 
setting to identify the effect of accounting conservatism on trade credit. Under the exogenous 
credit crunch shock, banks and other debt holders care more about firms’ credit-worthiness 
(Iyer et al., 2013). Therefore, the firms with less conservative financial reporting are 
extremely difficult to obtain debt financing (Balakrishnan et al., 2016). The sudden increase 
of trade credit during the crisis can be viewed as a function of accounting conservatism. By 
investigating the influence of accounting conservatism on the change of trade credit before 
and after the onset of crisis, I can identify the impact of accounting conservatism on trade 
credit. 
1.2.4 Empirical predictions 
The 2007-2008 global financial crisis provides a good opportunity to examine the 
influence of accounting conservatism on trade credit. Since less conservative firms have 
difficulties to obtain debt financing, they are more likely to use trade credit as an alternative 
financing source. In contrast, more conservative firms have less demand for trade credit since 
they are more likely to obtain debt financing. Summarizing the discussion in the previous 
subsections, I propose the following main prediction: 
H1. Firms with less conservative financial reporting are more likely to use trade credit 
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during the crisis. 
Suppliers’ information acquisition ability can moderate the influence of accounting 
conservatism on trade credit. Through intermediate inputs transaction, suppliers can acquire 
some information about customer firms (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 
2004). If suppliers can more easily acquire customer firms’ information, they will be more 
willing to offer trade credit to the customers with less conservative financial reporting. 
Therefore, I put forth the following prediction: 
H2. When a firm’s suppliers can acquire more information through intermediate inputs 
transaction with customers, the effect of accounting conservatism on trade credit is stronger. 
Furthermore, the inputs liquidation possibility can also moderate the impact of 
accounting conservatism on trade credit during the crisis. The intermediate inputs can work 
as collateral for trade credit (Mian and Smith, 1992; Giannetti et al., 2011), and suppliers 
usually have advantage in liquidating intermediate inputs because of professional expertise. 
Compared to differentiated inputs, the standardized inputs are easier to liquidate. Therefore, I 
propose the following prediction: 
H3. When a firm’s intermediate inputs are easier to liquidate, the effect of accounting 
conservatism on trade credit is stronger. 
The demand for trade credit can also moderate the effect of accounting conservatism on 
trade credit. Previous studies find the firms with financing frictions are more likely to use 
trade credit as an alternative financing source (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Fisman and Love, 
2003). When a firm with less conservative financial reporting faces more financing frictions, 
it is more difficult to obtain low-cost debt financing during the financial crisis. Consequently, 
the firm will have more demand for trade credit. So I propose the final prediction: 
H4. When a firm faces more financing frictions, the effect of accounting conservatism on 
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trade credit is stronger. 
1.3 Sample and research design 
1.3.1 Data and sample selection 
The sample consists of quarterly observations of U.S. incorporated public firms in 
Compustat, with fiscal quarter ending between July 2006 and June 2008. Following Duchin et 
al. (2010), I identify July 2007 as the beginning of global financial crisis, when the U.S. 
subprime mortgages began to collapse. Since I am mainly interested in the financial crisis’s 
shock to external credit supply (i.e., the credit crunch shock), I identify the first year of the 
crisis (i.e., July 2007 – June 2008) as the post-crisis period. 3
1.3.2 Regression specification 
 To implement the 
Difference-in-Difference (DiD) analysis, I define one year prior to the crisis (i.e., July 2006 - 
June 2007) as the pre-crisis period. 
I exclude the financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999), the firms 
with negative value of sales, assets, or common value of equity. Following Garcia-Appendini 
and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), I also exclude firms with market capitalization less than $50 
million, as well as firms with book value of asset less than $10 million. The final sample 
includes 13281 firm-quarter observations with 1971 unique firms.  
I employ a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach to analyze the influence of 
accounting conservatism on trade credit before and after the onset of 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis, following Duchin et al. (2010). During the credit crunch shock, trade credit 
becomes an important alternative source of financing (Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). The change of trade credit before and after the onset of financial 
crisis can be written as a function of accounting conservatism.  
                                                             
3 As discussed in Duchin et al. (2010), the first year of the financial crisis is mainly a financial phenomenon, and it is 
characterized as a credit crunch shock. After the bankruptcy of Leman Brothers in 2008, the credit crunch shock is combined 
with demand side shock. Therefore, the period after the bankruptcy of Leman Brothers is not suitable for our research 
setting. 
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The regression equation is as follows: 
1 2it i t t i it itTradeCredit Crisis Crisis Conservatism Controlsα β β ε= + + × + +      (1) 
Where itTradeCredit refers to firm i’s use of trade credit at quarter t. tCrisis is an indicator 
variable for the post-crisis period, which equals one for the post-crisis period (July 2007 – 
June 2008) and zero for the pre-crisis period (July 2006 – June 2007). iConservatism refers 
to firm i’s accounting conservatism, which is measured between 2003 and 2005. The 
coefficient of interest is 2β , which represents the impact of accounting conservatism on the 
change of trade credit before and after the onset of global financial crisis. 
To mitigate unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable problem, I include firm fixed 
effects ( iα ) to control for the time-invariant variation in trade credit.
4
iConservatism Since is 
measured only once in the sample period, the level effect of iConservatism  is subsumed by 
the firm fixed effects, and the coefficient of iConservatism cannot be directly observed in the 
regression results (Balakrishnan et al., 2016). 
itControl represents the control variables that may influence a firm’s use of trade credit. 
Following previous literature (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Cuñat, 2007; Giannetti et al., 
2011; Klapper et al., 2012), I include cash holding, market share, sales growth, and profit 
margin as control variables. Since size, market to book ratio, and leverage are used to 
calculate the measure of conservatism, I also include size, market to book ratio, and leverage 
as control variables. All the control variables are based on the firm-quarter observations 
between July 2006 and June 2008. Appendix A contains all variable definitions. All the 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
                                                             
4 The Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach with firm fixed effects is widely used in prior literature on financial crisis 
analysis, such as Duchin et al. (2010), Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), and Balakrishnan et al. (2016). 
Furthermore, it is also used in Economics literature. For instance, Zhang and Zhu (2011) use similar method to analyze the 
influence of group size on internet users’ incentive to contribute, using the block of Chinese Wikipedia as a natural 
experiment. 
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The standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels using the method of 
Petersen (2009). 
1.3.3 Measure of trade credit 
Trade credit is recorded as accounts payable in the balance sheet. In the main tests, I 
measure a firm’s use of trade credit as accounts payable (AP) scaled by purchases, where 
purchases is calculated as cost of goods sold (COGS) plus change of inventory. The above 
measure is widely used in previous literature, such as Petersen and Rajan (1997), 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), and Murfin and Njoroge (2015). Previous 
studies find that trade credit usually has a short maturity: between one and four months (e.g., 
Ng et al., 1999; Klapper et al., 2012). Therefore, quarterly observations better capture the 
evolution of trade credit. An alternative measure of trade credit is days payable outstanding 
(DPO), which capture the average number of days that a company takes to pay its suppliers. 
However, since it is calculated as AP/Purchase multiply by 90 days, the regression results can 
be directly derived by multiplying 90 by that of AP/Purchase. 
1.3.4 Measure of accounting conservatism 
In the main tests, I employ the firm-specific conservatism measure developed by Khan 
and Watts (2009). Based on the cross-sectional regression specification of Basu (1997), Khan 
and Watts (2009) define the timeliness of earnings to good news as G_Score, and the 
incremental timeliness of bad news as C_Score. I use C_Score as the measure of conditional 
conservatism. A greater value of C_Score represents a higher degree of conditional 
conservatism. To mitigate measurement error, I calculate the three year average of C_Score 
prior to 2006 (i.e., 2003 – 2005).Following Khan and Watts (2009), I trim the top and bottom 
1% of earnings, returns, size, market to book ratio, and leverage, and I also eliminate the firms 
with price per share less than 1$. 
In section 5.1, I perform robustness test using two additional conservatism measures. 
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The first one is Basu (1997) timeliness measure, based on firm-specific time-series regression 
between 1996 and 2005. The second one is the accumulated non-operating accruals between 
2003 and 2005, following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008). 
1.4 Empirical results  
1.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for the main variables of interest. The mean 
value of trade credit is 0.60, which means on average accounts payable (AP) accounts for 60% 
of inputs purchase. It implies that trade credit is an important financing tool for short term 
liquidity. The mean value of days payable outstanding (DPO) is 53.68, indicating the sample 
firms on average take about two months to pay its suppliers. The mean value of Khan and 
Watts C_Score is 0.10, the median value is 0.09, and the standard deviation is 0.08, which is 
quite similar to the statistics of Khan and Watts (2009). 
[Insert Table 1.1 about here] 
Table 1.2 shows the Pearson correlation matrix between measures of accounting 
conservatism and control variables. Since accounting conservatism is measured prior to 2006, 
and the control variables are based on the firm-quarter observations between July 2006 and 
June 2008, the correlation coefficients are relatively low. There is not serious concern of 
multi-collinearity problem. One exception is the correlation between C_Score, size and 
leverage. However, since the level effect of conservatism is subsumed by the firm fixed 
effects, I only need to concern the correlation between the interaction Crisist×Conservatismi, 
size and leverage, which are much lower.5
1.4.2 Accounting conservatism and trade credit before and after the financial crisis 
 
[Insert Table 1.2 about here] 
Table 1.3 reports the influence of accounting conservatism on trade credit before and 
                                                             
5 The Pearson correlation between interaction Crisist×Conservatismi and size is 0.30, which is much lower than the 
correlation between Conservatismi and size (0.68). The correlation between Crisist×Conservatismi and leverage is 0.17, 
which is also much lower than that between Conservatismi and leverage (0.30). 
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after the onset of global financial crisis. To illustrate the influence of accounting 
conservatism on trade credit in different periods, I first do a sub-period analysis by separately 
estimating in pre-crisis and post-crisis period, respectively. As shown in column 1 and 2 of 
Table 1.3, accounting conservatism does not show significant influence on trade credit in 
pre-crisis period, whereas accounting conservatism negatively impact use of trade credit in 
post-crisis period, and the coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Column 3 introduce the interaction term of accounting conservatism and crisis indicator, 
to compare the different influence of accounting conservatism on trade credit. The coefficient 
estimate of interaction term is -0.347, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
negative coefficient implies that, compared to more conservative firms, less conservative 
firms are more likely to use trade credit during the financial crisis. 
Column 4 includes firm fixed effects to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted 
variables problem, following Duchin et al. (2010). Since accounting conservatism is only 
measured once prior to the crisis, the level effect of conservatism is subsumed by firm fixed 
effects. The coefficient estimate of interaction term is similar, which is -0.287 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Column 5 further introduces other controls, and the 
regression results are qualitatively similar.  
The above findings are consistent with the main hypothesis. The negative coefficient of 
interaction implies that, facing the credit crunch shock during the financial crisis, the less 
conservative firms are more likely to use trade credit as an alternative financing source. The 
coefficient estimate -0.255 in column 5 indicates that, with a firm’s accounting conservatism 
(C_Score) decreasing by one standard deviation (0.08), the firm’s quarterly accounts payable 
(AP) increase by 2.04% (=0.08*0.255) of total purchase. On annual basis, the firm’s accounts 
payable (AP) increase by 8.16% of total purchase, which is economically significant. 
To better interpret the empirical results, I also try alternative regression specifications. 
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First, I transform the continuous conservatism measure (C_Score) into a dummy variable, 
which equals one for the more conservative firms, and zero for the less conservative firms. 
Column 6 of Table 1.3 shows the estimates. The coefficient of interaction between crisis 
indicator and dummy conservatism measure is -0.049, which means the quarterly trade credit 
of less conservative firms is 4.9% higher than that of more conservative firms. In annual basis, 
it accounts for 19.6% of inputs purchase values. 
Second, I employ days payable outstanding (DPO) as an alternative dependent variable. 
Since days payable outstanding (DPO) can be calculated as AP/Purchase multiply by 90 days, 
the regression estimates with DPO as the dependent variable is equivalent to multiplying the 
estimates in Column 5 of Table 1.3 by 90. Therefore, the coefficient estimate of interaction 
between crisis indicator and Conservatism (C_Score) is -22.95 (-0.255*90). The above 
coefficient indicates that, with C_Score decreasing by one standard deviation (0.08), the firm 
takes about two more days (0.08*22.95) to pay its suppliers each quarter, and eight more days 
each year. If I employ dummy C_Score as the measure of conservatism, and the coefficient 
estimate of interaction term is -4.41 (-0.049*90), which means the less conservative firms 
take around 4.5 more days to pay their suppliers each quarter, and 18 days each year. 
[Insert Table 1.3 about here] 
To verify the regression specification, I do placebo tests using several placebo crisis 
periods. First, I employ the event of September 11, 2001 as a placebo crisis. Different from 
the credit supply shock during the global financial crisis, 9/11 event causes significant 
demand shock (Tong and Wei, 2008). Since credit supply does not significantly decrease 
after 9/11, accounting conservatism should not influence the change of trade credit before and 
after the 9/11 event.  
I define one year after the 9/11 event (i.e., October 2001 – September 2002) as the 
placebo post-crisis period, and one year before the 9/11 event (i.e., October 2000 – 
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September 2001) as the placebo pre-crisis period. Column 1 of Table 1.4 reports the 
regression results. Although the coefficient estimates of interaction term is negative, but it is 
not statistically significant.  
I also try two other placebo crisis periods. The first placebo crisis is set to the period 
between July 2006 and June 2007, which is one year before the global financial crisis. The 
second placebo crisis is set to the period between July 2008 and June 2009, which is one year 
after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, and credit supply shock is combined with demand 
side shock in that period. Column 2 and 3 of Table 1.4 illustrates that accounting 
conservatism does not have significant impact on the change of trade credit during the two 
placebo crises. Overall, the above placebo tests indicate that, the credit crunch shock that 
took place during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis provides a suitable research setting to 
examine the effect of accounting conservatism on trade credit. 
[Insert Table 1.4 about here] 
1.4.3 Role of suppliers’ information acquisition ability 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that, the effect of accounting conservatism on trade credit during 
the crisis is stronger when suppliers can acquire more information about customer firms. To 
test Hypothesis 2, I do subsample analysis based on suppliers’ information acquisition ability. 
The primary measure of suppliers’ information acquisition ability is the proportion of 
intermediate inputs to the total outputs. I measure it at the industry level. If a downstream 
industry needs more intermediate inputs in the production process, its suppliers can more 
easily acquire customer’s information through intermediate inputs transactions (Biais and 
Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
I calculate the proportion of total intermediate inputs based on the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output make table and use table (2002). The BEA make table 
reports the total outputs of each industry, and the BEA use table reports each industry’s use of 
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intermediate inputs from its upstream industries. Combining both make table and use table, I 
obtain the proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs for each industry.6
Column 1 and 2 of Table 1.5 reports the regression estimates. As shown in Column 2, 
the coefficient of interaction crisis×conservatism is significantly negative when suppliers can 
more easily acquire customers’ information. The coefficient is -0.497, which is higher than 
the coefficient in Table 1.3. The above result suggests that, when suppliers have superior 
information advantage, they are more likely offer trade credit to the less conservative firms. 
Whereas, as shown in Column 1, when suppliers cannot efficiently acquire customers’ 
information, they are less likely to offer trade credit. The coefficient of interaction 
crisis×conservatism is not statistically significant, and the magnitude of coefficient estimate 
is also smaller than that of Column 2. 
 
As shown in Table 1.1, the mean and median proportion of intermediate inputs is 0.48 
and 0.47, respectively. On average, the intermediate inputs account for almost half of total 
outputs. To better illustrate the proportion of intermediate inputs in each industry, I list the 
top and bottom ten industries in Appendix B. The top ten industries include wet corn milling, 
soft drink and ice manufacturing, petroleum refineries etc. All these industries need a large 
proportion of intermediate inputs. The proportion of intermediate inputs in wet corn milling 
industry is as high as 0.870. The bottom ten industries include legal services, motion picture 
and video industries, employment services etc.  
I partition the total sample into two subsamples based on the proportion of intermediate 
inputs to total outputs. If an industry use a higher proportion of intermediate inputs, its 
suppliers can more acquire more information through intermediate inputs transaction. 
Therefore, the firms in that industry are more likely to receive trade credit from suppliers 
during the crisis.  
                                                             
6 The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) make and use table are based on the 6-digit BEA input-output industry code 
(2002). To merge with Compustat firms, I employ the cross walk table between BEA input-output industry code and North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. 
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I further test the difference of coefficient estimates for interaction crisis×conservatism. 
The null hypothesis is that the two subsamples have the same coefficient estimates for 
interaction term, and the alternative hypothesis the coefficient of interaction term in the “low” 
proportion subsample is smaller than that of “high” proportion subsample. The χ2 statistic is 
3.55 with the p-value of 0.029. So I can conclude that the influence of accounting 
conservatism on trade credit is more pronounced when suppliers have higher information 
acquisition ability. 
[Insert Table 1.5 about here] 
I also employ the supplier-customer geographical distance as an alternative proxy for 
suppliers’ information acquisition ability. When a supplier is geographicalally closer to its 
customers, it can more easily monitor customers’ credit-worthiness (Dass et al., 2015). The 
geographical distance between an industry and its supply industries is calculated as the 
proportion of the industry’s total transportation costs for purchasing intermediate inputs to its 
total inputs value. A lower proportion of transportation cost indicates closer geographical 
distance. The data of transportation cost and inputs value are from the BEA input-output use 
table (2002). As shown in Table 1.1, on average transportation costs account for 0.01 of total 
inputs values.  
I partition the sample into two subsamples based on the supplier-customer geographical 
distance, and the regression estimates are reported in Column 3 and 4 of Table 1.5. When a 
customer has lower geographical distance with its suppliers, the impact of accounting 
conservatism on trade credit during the crisis is statistically significant. In contrast, the 
impact of accounting conservatism is not significant when the geographical distance is higher. 
However, the χ2 statistic is not statistically significant, which could because transportation 
costs contain some biases since it could be influenced by the physical properties of 
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intermediate inputs.7
1.4.4 Role of inputs liquidation possibility 
 
According to Hypothesis 3, when a firm’s intermediate inputs are easier to liquidate, the 
firm’s suppliers are exposed to less loss if selling on credit, and they are more willing to offer 
trade credit to less conservative firms. Therefore, the negative impact of accounting 
conservatism on trade credit should be more pronounced. To test Hypothesis 3, I do 
subsample analysis based on the liquidation possibility of intermediate inputs. 
I measure the liquidation possibility of intermediate inputs at industry level, following 
Nunn (2007). 8
The subsample analysis based on the inputs liquidation possibility is reported in Table 1.6. 
When an industry’s inputs have higher liquidation possibility, the coefficient estimate of 
interaction crisis×conservatism is -0.610, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
results suggest that, when a firm’s inputs are easier to liquidate, its suppliers are more likely to 
take risk and offer trade credit to less conservative customer firms. In contrast, when a firm’s 
inputs are difficult to liquidate, accounting conservatism does not show significant effect on 
trade credit during the crisis. The χ2 statistic is 3.26 with the p-value of 0.035, suggesting 
the impact of accounting conservatism on trade credit is more pronounced when a firm’s 
 Compared to differentiated inputs, the standardized goods is easier to 
liquidate. Rauch (1999) shows that the standardized inputs are usually sold on organized 
exchanges or reference priced in trade publications. Nunn (2007) further use the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output use table (1997) to identify each industry’s 
intermediate inputs. A downstream industry’s inputs liquidation possibility is then calculated 
as the average proportion of standardized inputs. As shown in Table 1.1, the mean value of 
inputs liquidation possibility is 0.31, indicating the average proportion of standardized inputs 
for all the industries is around 0.31.  
                                                             
7 For instance, when the intermediate inputs have higher weight, size, or volume, they might need more transportation costs 
even if the geographicalal distance is not so far away. 
8 Nunn (2007)’s measure has been widely used in prior literature, such as Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Dou et al. (2013). 
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input is easier to liquidate. 
[Insert Table 1.6 about here] 
1.4.5 Role of financing frictions 
According to Hypothesis 4, the influence of accounting conservatism on trade credit is 
more pronounced when a firm faces more financing frictions. To test Hypothesis 4, I do 
subsample analysis based on firms’ financing frictions. I measure a firm’s financing frictions 
from three different perspectives. First, I use the Kaplan-Zingales index to measure a firm’s 
financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). The Kaplan-Zingales index is calculated at 
the end of fiscal year 2005, and the coefficients are from Lamont et al. (2001). A higher value 
of Kaplan-Zingales index represents a higher level of financial constraints.  
The second proxy for financing frictions is a firm’s access to bank line of credit. The 
2007-2008 financial crisis is characterized as bank credit supply shock. If a firm has access to 
bank line of credit prior to the crisis, it is expected to be exposed to less shock during the 
crisis. The data from bank line of credit is from Sufi (2009), which is based on the 
observation between 1996 and 2003. A firm is exposed to less financing frictions if it has 
access to bank line of credit and its cash flow is above the sample median in every year from 
1996 to 2003. 
The third proxy for a firm’s financing frictions is the suppliers’ liquidity. The trade 
credit that a customer firm receives depends on its suppliers’ liquidity level. 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) find the suppliers with high pre-crisis 
liquidity level offer more trade credit to customer firms during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
Following Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), I measure a firm’s pre-crisis 
liquidity level as the ratio of cash reserve to total assets at the last fiscal quarter before July 
2006. An industry’s supply industries are identified based on the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) input-output use table (2002). 
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The regression estimates are reported in Table 1.7. When a firm has a higher level of 
financial constraints or does not have access to bank line of credit, the negative influence of 
accounting conservatism on trade credit is statistically significant. The χ2 statistic for both 
subsample are 2.13 and 3.48, with the p-values of 0.072 and 0.031, respectively. The above 
results suggest that, when a less conservative firm is exposed to higher level of financing 
frictions during the financial crisis, it is more likely to use trade credit as an alternative 
financing source. 
Column 5 and 6 of Table 1.7 report the estimates for the subsamples based on suppliers’ 
liquidity. When a firm’s suppliers hold higher level of liquidity prior to the crisis, the firm is 
more likely to receive trade credit from suppliers. As shown in Column 6, the coefficient 
estimate of interaction crisis×conservatism is -0.269, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In contrast, in Column 5 when suppliers do not hold enough liquidity, the less 
conservative firms cannot get enough trade credit during the crisis. 
[Insert Table 1.7 about here] 
1.5 Additional analyses 
1.5.1 Robustness tests 
I use two alternative measures of accounting conservatism to check the robustness of the 
main results. The first proxy is Basu (1997) timeliness measure, which is calculated based on 
firm-specific time-series regressions between 1996 and 2005, with minimum requirement of 
7 years of observations. The second one is the accumulated non-operating accruals between 
2003 and 2005. Following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008), I calculate the 
accumulated non-operating accruals between 2003 and 2005, scaled by the accumulated total 
assets, and multiply by negative one.  
Panel A of Table 1.8 reports the regression estimates based on Basu timeliness measure. 
In the total sample, the coefficient of interaction crisis×conservatismis negative, but it is not 
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statistically significant. I further check the regression results for different subsamples. As 
shown in Column 2 and 4, when suppliers have higher information acquisition ability or 
when the firm faces higher financing frictions, the coefficients of interaction 
crisis×conservatism are negative and statistically significant. The above results suggest that, 
Basu timeliness measure might not be able to provide enough variations to identify the 
influence of accounting conservatism on trade credit. 
Panel B of Table 1.8 demonstrates the regression estimates based on the accumulated 
non-operating accruals. Accumulated non-operating accruals significantly impact trade credit 
during the crisis in the total sample. However, in the subsamples when suppliers have higher 
information acquisition ability, when inputs are easier to liquidate, or when firms face higher 
financing frictions, I do observe the significantly negative influence of accounting 
conservatism on trade credit.9
1.5.2 Alternative explanation 
 Since the accumulated non-operating accruals capture not only 
conditional conservatism but also unconditional conservatism, the measurement noise could 
result in weaker results.  
[Insert Table 1.8 about here] 
I also check the robustness by eliminating the wholesale and retailing industry (SIC 
5000-5999). Murfin and Njoroge (2015) find the smaller suppliers usually have to provide 
trade credit to their large retailer, which could weaken the link between accounting 
conservatism and trade credit. The untabulated results show the main results still hold even if 
I drop the wholesale and retailing industry.  
The relative bargaining power could be another possible driver behind the link between 
accounting conservatism and trade credit. When a less conservative firm has relative more 
bargaining power compared to its suppliers, it could still receive trade credit even if its 
                                                             
9 Another proxy proposed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) is the difference between skewness of earnings and skewness of cash 
flow. I also try this proxy, but it does not show significant impact on trade credit. 
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suppliers do not have enough information or liquidation advantage. 
To test the above argument, I do subsample analysis based on the industry competition. 
If a company operates in a less competitive industry, it tends to have more bargaining power, 
and it is more likely to receive trade credit from its suppliers. Therefore, the negative 
influence of accounting conservatism on trade credit should be more pronounced. 
I employ three measures of industry competition. The first measure is Compustat based 
Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated based on the largest 50 firms in each 
4-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industries in Compustat at the end of 2005. Ali 
et al. (2009) argue the Compustat based industry competition measure is biased, so I further 
use the U.S. Census based HHI in 2002 as the second measure of competition.10
The regression results are reported in Table 1.9. As shown in the first two columns, 
when the Compustat based HHI is used, accounting conservatism significantly impacts trade 
credit in the “low” competition subsample. In Column 3 and 4, when the Census based HHI 
is used, there is not significant difference between the “high” and “low” competition 
subsamples. In the last two columns, when the fitted HHI is used, the coefficient of 
interaction term in the “low” competition subsample is significant, but the χ2statistic is not 
significant, with the p-value of 0.355. Overall, although some results suggest bargaining 
power could play a role in the trade credit provision process, the bargaining power argument 
needs to be further checked.  
[Insert Table 1.9 about here] 
 The last 
measure is the fitted HHI in 2005, which is developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and 
already used in prior literature, such as Dhaliwal et al. (2014). 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate the effect of accounting conservatism on trade credit using the 
                                                             
10
 The U.S. Census based Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) is shared by Sandy Klasa, thanks Sandy for sharing the 
dataset. 
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2007-2008 global financial crisis as an external shock to bank credit supply. In this setting, 
trade credit becomes an importance alternative financing source. The less conservative firms 
should have more demand for trade credit since they are more difficult to obtain credit from 
the prudent banks during the crisis. Meanwhile, suppliers can acquire extra information 
through intermediate inputs transaction, and they can also use intermediate inputs as the 
collateral for trade credit. Compared to banks or other debt providers, suppliers would be 
more willing to offer credit to customer firms. Therefore, I predict the less conservative firms 
are more likely to use trade credit during the crisis.  
I employ a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach to investigate the impact of 
accounting conservatism on trade credit during the crisis. A firm’s trade credit before and 
after the crisis can be written as the function of accounting conservatism. I find that, 
compared to more conservative firms, the firms with less conservative financial reporting use 
more trade credit during the financial crisis. The above findings indicate that suppliers 
acquire customers’ information through multiple channels. I provide further evidence to 
support the debt contracting benefits of accounting conservatism, and it also complements the 
literature on accounting conservatism and supplier-customer relationship.
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Appendix 1.A 
Variable definitions 
Variables Definition 
Trade credit Firms' use of trade credit. It is measured as accounts payable (AP) scaled by 
purchase, where purchase is calculated as cost of goods sold (COGS) plus change 
of inventory. 
Days payable outstanding 
(DPO) 
Average number of days a company takes to pay its suppliers. It is calculated as 
accounts payable (AP) divided by purchase, then multiply by 90 days (for one 
quarter). 
Crisis Indicator variable for the post-crisis period. It equals one for the period between 
July 2007 and June 2008, and zero for the period between July 2006 and June 
2007. 
C_Score Khan and Watts (2009)'s asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism. To 
mitigate measurement errors, take the three-year average measure prior to 2006 
(i.e., 2003-2005). 
C_Score (dummy) Indicator variable for Khan and Watts (2009)'s asymmetric timeliness measure 
of conservatism. It equals one if a firm's C_Score is above the sample median, 
and zero otherwise. 
Basu timeliness Basu (1997)'s asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism. The measure is 
calculated based on firm-specific time-series regression between 1996 and 
2005, the minimum of seven years of observations for each firm are required. 
Accumulated non-operating 
accruals 
The accumulated non-operating accruals between 2003 and 2005, scaled by the 
accumulated total assets, and multiply by negative one, following Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008).  
Cash holding Cash and short-term investment divided by total assets. 
Market share Firms' market share of sales, which is calculated based on 3-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
Sales growth Sales growth rate relative to the same quarter of previous year. 
Profit margin Income before extraordinary items divided by sales. 
Size Natural log of market value of equity. 
Market to book Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
Leverage (long term debt + current debt) / market value of equity. 
Kaplan-Zingales index Financial constraints index that is calculated at the end of fiscal year 2005, 
following Kaplan and Zingales (1997). A higher value of Kaplan-Zingales index 
represents higher level of financial constraints. The coefficients are from 
Lamont et al. (2001). 
Line of credit Indicator variable for access to bank line of credit. It equals one if a firm has 
access to bank line of credit and its cash flow is above the sample median in 
every year between 1996 and 2003, and zero otherwise. The data of access to 
bank line of credit is from Sufi (2009). 
Suppliers' liquidity Supply industries' liquidity level prior to the global financial crisis. The liquidity 
level is measured as the ratio of cash reserve to total assets at the last fiscal 
quarter ending before July 2006, following Garcia-Appendini and 
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Montoriol-Garriga (2013). An industry's supply industries are identified based 
on the 2002 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Input-Output use table. 
Proportion of intermediate 
inputs to total outputs 
An industry's proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs. A higher 
proportion implies suppliers have more opportunity to acquire customer firms' 
credit-worthiness information through intermediate inputs transactions. The 
inputs data is from the 2002 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Input-Output 
use table, the output data is from the 2002 BEA make table. 
Supplier-customer 
geographical distance 
The geographical distance between an industry and its supply industries. It is 
proxied by the proportion of an industry’s total transportation cost for 
purchasing intermediate inputs to its total inputs. A lower proportion of 
transportation cost implies closer geographical distance. The inputs and 
transportation cost data are from the 2002 BEA Input-Output use table. 
Inputs liquidation possibility The possibility to liquidate intermediate inputs, the data is from Nunn (2007). 
The standardized input is easier to liquidate. The classification of differentiated 
goods and standardized goods is from Rauch (1999). Nunn (2007) identify each 
industry’s inputs based on the 1997 BEA Input-Output use table. 
Industry competition An industry's product market competition level prior to the global financial 
crisis. A lower level of industry competition implies that the firms in that 
industry have higher bargaining power relative to their suppliers. I use three 
measures of industry competition. The first one is the Compustat based 
Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated based on largest 50 firms 
for each 4-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industries in Compustat 
at the end 2005. The second measure is the Census based on HHI in 2002, 
which is from Ali et al. (2009). The third measure is the fitted HHI in 2005, 
which is from Hoberg and Phillips (2010).  
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Appendix 1.B 
Proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs across industries 
BEA input- 
output industry  
code (2002) 
BEA input-output industry title (2002) Proportion of  
intermediate inputs  
to total outputs 
311221 Wet corn milling     0.870  
336120 Heavy duty truck manufacturing  0.865  
312110 Soft drink and ice manufacturing  0.854  
324110 Petroleum refineries  0.841  
336112 Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing  0.793  
325220 Artificial and synthetic fibers and filaments manufacturing   0.790  
311700 Seafood product preparation and packaging      0.788  
311920 Coffee and tea manufacturing    0.788  
325211 Plastics material and resin manufacturing  0.787  
325181 Alkalies and chlorine manufacturing     0.773  
… … … 
5419A0 All other miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services   0.263  
541100 Legal services  0.252  
512100 Motion picture and video industries     0.250  
541200 Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services    0.245  
312140 Distilleries   0.230  
812300 Dry-cleaning and laundry services   0.213  
3122A0 Tobacco product manufacturing   0.195  
533000 Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets  0.187  
561300 Employment services  0.166  
531000 Real estate  0.154  
This table presents the proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs across different downstream industries. 
The industry classification is based on 6-digit Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output industry code 
(2002). The first ten rows show the industries with the highest proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs, 
and the last ten rows show the industries with the lowest proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs. The 
other industries are not tabulated.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics 
 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75 
Dependent Variable 
      
Trade credit 13281 0.60  0.79  0.27  0.42  0.62  
Days payable outstanding (DPO) 13281 53.68  70.96  24.35  37.81  56.19  
       
Crisis indicator 13281 0.46  0.50  0  0  1  
       
Conservatism 
      
C_Score 13281 0.10  0.08  0.04  0.09  0.14  
C_Score (dummy) 13281 0.50  0.50  0  0  1  
Basu timeliness 12946 0.06  0.86  -0.10  0.02  0.18  
Accumulated non-operating accruals 6920 0.03  0.10  0.01  0.02  0.05  
       
Control variables 
      
Cash holding 13281 0.18  0.21  0.03  0.10  0.28  
Market share 13281 0.08  0.16  0.00  0.01  0.08  
Sales growth 13281 0.16  0.44  0.01  0.10  0.21  
Profit margin 13281 -0.20  2.24  0.01  0.05  0.10  
Size 13281 6.88  1.57  5.68  6.74  7.91  
Market to book 13281 3.13  3.18  1.63  2.43  3.70  
Leverage 13281 0.26  0.60  0.00  0.11  0.30  
       
Moderating factors 
      
Kaplan-Zingales index 12061 -4.83  14.01  -4.74  -1.11  0.55  
Line of credit 12068 0.24  0.43  0  0  1  
Suppliers' liquidity 12881 0.11  0.03  0.09  0.10  0.12  
Proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs 12889 0.48  0.14  0.37  0.47  0.59  
Supplier-customer geographical distance 12896 0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  
Inputs liquidation possibility 8559 0.31  0.23  0.19  0.38  0.50  
Market competition 13230 0.24  0.19  0.12  0.18  0.27  
This table presents the summary statistics for the main variables of interests. The dependent variables and 
control variables are based on the firm-quarter observations from July 2006 to June 2008. Accounting 
conservatism and moderating factors are based on the measurement prior to 2006. The post-crisis period is 
defined as between July 2007 and June 2008, and the pre-crisis period is defined as one year before the crisis 
(i.e., July 2006 - June 2007). Kaplan-Zingales index and line of credit are firm-level variables, and all the other 
moderating factors are industry-level variables. Suppliers’ liquidity, the proportion of intermediate inputs to total 
outputs, supplier-customer geographical distance, and input liquidation possibility are based on the 6-digit 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Input-Output industry code (2002). The reported industry market 
competition in Table 1.1 is calculated based on the Compustat firm at the 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code. The statistics for Census based HHI and fitted HHI are untabulated. All the dependent 
variables, measures of conservatism, and control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Appendix A 
contains all variable definitions.
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Table 1.2: Correlation matrix 
 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI 
C_Score 1.00  
          
C_Score (dummy) 0.75  1.00  
         
Basu timeliness 0.05  0.01  1.00  
        
Accumulated non-operating accruals 0.01  0.04  0.01  1.00  
       
Cash holding  -0.01  0.05  0.00  0.08  1.00  
      
Market share  -0.25  -0.20  -0.01  -0.06  -0.25  1.00  
     
Sales growth 0.05  0.06  0.01  0.05  0.09  -0.06  1.00  
    
Profit margin -0.06  -0.07  0.01  -0.03  -0.24  0.06  -0.03  1.00  
   
Size -0.68  -0.61  0.00  -0.06  -0.20  0.38  -0.01  0.11  1.00  
  
Market to book -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  0.07  0.14  0.02  0.09  -0.06  0.17  1.00  
 
Leverage 0.30  0.15  -0.01  -0.03  -0.23  0.05  -0.02  0.00  -0.07  -0.14  1.00  
This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix of accounting conservatism and control variables. All the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Appendix A 
contains all variable definitions.
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Table 1.3: Accounting conservatism and trade credit before and after the financial crisis 
 
  Sub-period   Total period 
 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
 
OLS FE FE FE(dummy C_Score) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Crisis    0.029 0.015 0.012 0.012 
    (1.34) (0.76) (0.61) (0.60) 
Conservatism 0.040 -0.343** 
 
0.025 
   
 (0.39) (-4.76) 
 
(0.28) 
   
Crisis × Conservatism    -0.347*** -0.287** -0.255** -0.049** 
    (-3.58) (-2.44) (-2.09) (-2.57) 
Cash holding 0.194* 0.175*** 
 
0.185*** 0.144 0.104 0.100 
 (2.95) (9.75) 
 
(5.30) (1.35) (1.11) (1.08) 
Market share -0.318*** -0.343*** 
 
-0.330*** -0.038 -0.017 -0.015 
 (-22.56) (-15.12) 
 
(-24.23) (-0.51) (-0.24) (-0.22) 
Sales growth 0.092 0.204** 
 
0.142*** -0.042 -0.036 -0.036 
 (2.07) (5.04) 
 
(4.09) (-1.16) (-0.97) (-0.96) 
Profit margin -0.009 -0.004 
 
-0.007 0.009 0.012 0.012 
 
(-1.47) (-0.76) 
 
(-1.63) (0.99) (1.48) (1.48) 
Size 
     
-0.022 -0.022 
      
(-0.68) (-0.68) 
Market to book 
     
0.001 0.001 
      
(0.43) (0.46) 
Leverage 
     
-0.033 -0.034 
      
(-0.99) (-1.00) 
Firm fixed effects No No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7350 6429  13779 13748 13281 13281 
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.024   0.016 0.762 0.767 0.767 
This table presents the impact of accounting conservatism on trade credit before and after the onset of global 
financial crisis. The sample period ranges from July 2006 to June 2008. The post-crisis period is defined as the 
period between July 2007 and June 2008, whereas the period from July 2006 to June 2007 is defined as 
pre-crisis period. Crisis is an indicator variable, which equals one for the post-crisis period, and zero for the 
pre-crisis period. The dependent variable is trade credit, which is measured as accounts payable scaled by 
purchase. Conservatism is measured as the C_Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009), I take the three-year 
average of C_Score between 2003 and 2005 to reduce measurement errors. Appendix A contains all variable 
definitions. Column 1 and 2 correspond to the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression results in pre-crisis and 
post-crisis period, respectively. Column 3 introduce the interaction term of Crisis and conservatism using OLS 
regression. Column 4-6 use firm fixed effects to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables problem, 
following Duchin et al. (2010). Therefore, the level effect of accounting conservatism is subsumed by the firm 
fixed effects. In column 6, the dummy transformation of C_Score is used as the proxy for accounting 
conservatism. Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels, following Petersen (2009). 
T-statistics are reported in brackets, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Placebo test 
 
  9/11 demand shock 2006Q3-2007Q2 2008Q3-2009Q2 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Crisis -0.002 0.004 -0.017 
 (-0.16) (0.27) (-0.61) 
Crisis × Conservatism -0.108 0.099 -0.233 
 (-0.61) (0.84) (-1.17) 
Cash holding 0.142 -0.133 0.128 
 (1.39) (-1.43) (1.18) 
Market share 0.116 -0.009 0.003 
 (1.48) (-0.14) (0.04) 
Sales growth -0.041* -0.017 -0.050 
 (-1.70) (-0.62) (-1.64) 
Profit margin 0.002 -0.003 0.004 
 
(0.56) (-0.44) (0.40) 
Size 0.002 -0.004 -0.031 
 
(0.12) (-0.14) (-1.32) 
Market to book -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 
(-0.56) (-1.00) (0.45) 
Leverage 0.005 -0.005 0.009 
 
(0.57) (-0.28) (0.46) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12308 13972 12534 
Adjusted R-squared 0.731 0.768 0.684 
This table presents the regression estimates from placebo tests. Column 1 uses the demand shock caused by the 
event September 11, 2001 as a placebo crisis. The placebo crisis period is set to between October 2001 and 
September 2002. Column 2 set the placebo crisis as the period between July 2006 and June 2007. Column 3 set 
the period from July 2008 and June 2009 as the placebo crisis period. The dependent variable is trade credit, 
which is calculated as accounts payable scaled by purchase. Accounting conservatism is measured with C_Score 
developed by Khan and Watts (2009), and I take the three-year average of C_Score before the sample period to 
mitigate measurement errors. The range of sample period includes the placebo crisis period and one year prior to 
the placebo crisis. Crisis is an indicator variable for the placebo crisis period, which equals one for the placebo 
crisis period, and zero for the year prior to placebo crisis period. Firm fixed effects are included in all the 
regressions to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables problem, following Duchin et al. (2010). 
Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels, and T-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.5: Subsample analysis based on suppliers' information acquisition ability 
 
  
Proportion of intermediate 
 inputs to total outputs 
  Supplier-customer  
geographical distance 
 
Low High 
 
High Low 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Crisis -0.007 0.034* 
 
0.000 0.024 
 (-0.25) (1.75) 
 
(0.01) (0.99) 
Crisis × Conservatism -0.028 -0.497** 
 
-0.310 -0.212* 
 (-0.18) (-2.18) 
 
(-1.47) (-1.92) 
Cash holding 0.188 -0.054 
 
-0.078 0.222 
 (1.33) (-0.79) 
 
(-0.95) (1.50) 
Market share -0.119 0.049 
 
0.014 -0.121 
 (-1.14) (0.56) 
 
(0.23) (-0.83) 
Sales growth -0.031 -0.014 
 
-0.056* -0.027 
 (-0.66) (-0.32) 
 
(-1.65) (-0.57) 
Profit margin 0.011 0.009 
 
0.020* 0.009 
 
(1.10) (1.02) 
 
(1.69) (1.10) 
Size -0.022 -0.010 
 
0.059 -0.075* 
 
(-0.99) (-0.18) 
 
(1.59) (-1.80) 
Market to book 0.003 -0.002 
 
-0.004* 0.003 
 
(1.58) (-1.01) 
 
(-1.91) (1.02) 
Leverage -0.007 -0.071 
 
0.030** -0.102* 
 
(-0.90) (-1.01) 
 
(2.52) (-1.73) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 6430 6459 
 
6457 6439 
Adjusted R-squared 0.721 0.824 
 
0.582 0.805 
Difference in coefficient of 3.55 
 
0.06 
Crisis × Conservatism (0.029)   (0.594) 
This table presents the subsample estimates based on suppliers’ information acquisition ability. The dependent 
variable is trade credit, which is calculated as accounts payable scaled by purchase. Accounting conservatism is 
measured as the C_Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009).The sample range from July 2006 to June 2008, 
and the post-crisis period is defined as between July 2007 and June 2008. Appendix A contains all variable 
definitions. Column 1 and 2 correspond to the subsamples analysis based on the proportion of intermediate 
inputs to total outputs. A higher proportion of intermediate inputs to total outputs implies suppliers have more 
opportunity to acquire customer firms’ credit-worthiness. Column 3 and 4 correspond to subsamples analysis 
based on the geographical distance between an industry and its supply industries, which is measured as the 
proportion of an industry’s total transportation cost for purchasing inputs to its total inputs value. A lower 
proportion of transportation cost implies closer geographicalal distance between a customer and its suppliers, 
and suppliers can more easily monitor customer firms. The data of each industry’s inputs and transportation 
costs are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output use table (2002), the industry’s 
outputs are from the BEA make table (2002). The industry classification is based on 6-digit BEA input-output 
industry code (2002). To test the difference in coefficient estimates for the interaction Crisis×Conservatism, the 
null hypothesis is that two subsamples have the same coefficient estimate on Crisis×Conservatism, and the 
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alternative hypothesis is that the coefficient estimate of Crisis×Conservatism in the left-hand-side subsample is 
lower than that of right-hand-side subsample. The χ2 statistics and p-values are reported at the bottom of the 
table. All regressions include firm fixed effects to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables 
problem, following Duchin et al. (2010). Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels, and 
T-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Subsample analysis based on inputs liquidation possibility 
 
  Inputs liquidation possibility 
 
Low High 
  (1) (2) 
Crisis -0.023 0.047** 
 (-1.14) (2.01) 
Crisis × Conservatism -0.013 -0.610** 
 (-0.15) (-2.03) 
Cash holding 0.107 0.130 
 (0.74) (0.58) 
Market share 0.196 0.013 
 (0.90) (0.14) 
Sales growth -0.020 -0.013 
 (-0.41) (-0.27) 
Profit margin 0.016 0.008 
 
(1.52) (0.97) 
Size -0.025 0.044 
 
(-0.76) (0.76) 
Market to book 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.78) (-0.28) 
Leverage 0.107 0.006 
 
(1.47) (0.32) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4275 4284 
Adjusted R-squared 0.600 0.805 
Difference in coefficient of 3.26 
Crisis × Conservatism (0.035) 
This table presents the subsample estimates based on the input liquidation possibility. The dependent variable is 
trade credit, which is calculated as accounts payable scaled by purchase. Accounting conservatism is measured 
as the C_Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009), and I take three-year average between 2003 and 2005 to 
mitigate measurement errors. The sample ranges from July 2006 to June 2008, and the post-crisis period is 
defined as between July 2007 and June 2008. Appendix A contains all variable definitions. The liquidation 
possibility of an industry’s inputs is measured following Nunn (2007). The standardized inputs that are sold on 
organized exchanges or reference priced in trade publications are more easily to liquidate, while the 
differentiated inputs are difficult to liquidate. Nunn (2007) identify an industry’s inputs based on the BEA 
input-output use table (1999), and classification of differentiated inputs and standardized inputs is from Rauch 
(1999). To test the difference in coefficient estimate for interaction Crisis×Conservatism, the null hypothesis is 
that two subsamples have the same coefficient on Crisis×Conservatism, and the alternative hypothesis is that 
the coefficient of Crisis×Conservatism in the “low” input liquidation possibility subsample is smaller than that 
of “high” input liquidation possibility subsample. The χ2 statistics and p-values are reported at the bottom of 
the table. All regressions include firm fixed effects to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables 
problem, following Duchin et al. (2010). Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels, and 
T-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
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levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.7: Subsample analysis based on financing frictions 
 
  Kaplan-Zingales index   Line of credit   Suppliers' liquidity 
 
Low High 
 
Yes No 
 
Low High 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Crisis 0.012 0.003 
 
-0.001 0.013 
 
0.007 0.018 
 (0.71) (0.14) 
 
(-0.05) (0.53) 
 
(0.29) (0.83) 
Crisis × Conservatism 0.018 -0.169*** 
 
0.092 -0.277* 
 
-0.234 -0.269*** 
 (0.14) (-2.86) 
 
(0.93) (-1.74) 
 
(-1.29) (-2.62) 
Cash holding 0.264** -0.104 
 
-0.021 0.109 
 
0.051 0.130 
 (2.15) (-0.75) 
 
(-0.13) (0.84) 
 
(1.05) (0.90) 
Market share -0.130 -0.134** 
 
-0.027 -0.047 
 
-0.009 -0.066 
 (-1.56) (-2.11) 
 
(-0.53) (-0.47) 
 
(-0.14) (-0.41) 
Sales growth -0.025 -0.050 
 
-0.026 -0.060 
 
-0.023 -0.040 
 (-0.34) (-1.42) 
 
(-1.06) (-1.60) 
 
(-1.17) (-0.85) 
Profit margin 0.007 0.015 
 
-0.182* 0.013 
 
0.015 0.011 
 
(0.48) (1.36) 
 
(-1.69) (1.37) 
 
(0.97) (1.17) 
Size -0.079*** 0.025 
 
0.009 0.014 
 
-0.039 -0.009 
 
(-3.06) (0.87) 
 
(0.22) (0.52) 
 
(-0.69) (-0.28) 
Market to book 0.000 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.002 
 
(0.45) (0.80) 
 
(-0.29) (0.40) 
 
(-0.29) (0.60) 
Leverage -0.020 0.010 
 
0.013 0.008 
 
-0.044 -0.026 
 
(-0.81) (0.74) 
 
(1.00) (0.87) 
 
(-0.96) (-0.83) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 6032 6029 
 
2940 9128 
 
6455 6426 
Adjusted R-squared 0.701 0.804 
 
0.817 0.761 
 
0.716 0.776 
Difference in coefficient of 2.13 
 
3.48 
 
0.00 
Crisis × Conservatism (0.072)   (0.031)   (0.474) 
This table presents the subsample estimates based on firms’ financing frictions. The dependent variable is trade 
credit, which is calculated as accounts payable scaled by purchase. Accounting conservatism is measured as the 
C_Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009), and I take three-year average between 2003 and 2005 to mitigate 
measurement errors. The sample ranges from July 2006 to June 2008, and the post-crisis period is defined as 
between July 2007 and June 2008. Column 1 and 2 correspond to subsamples analysis based on firms’ financial 
constraints, which is measured as the Kaplan-Zingales index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) at the end of fiscal 
year 2005. A higher value of Kaplan-Zingales index represents the higher level of financial constraints. The 
coefficients of Kaplan and Zingales index are from Lamont et al. (2001). Column 3 and 4 correspond to 
subsamples analysis based on firms’ access to bank line of credit. A firm is viewed as having access to bank line 
of credit if it contains bank line of credit and its cash flow is above the sample median in every year between 
1996 and 2003. The dataset for firms’ access to bank line of credit is from Sufi (2009). If a firm does not have 
access to bank line of credit, it usually faces more financing frictions. Column 5 and 6 correspond to subsample 
analysis based on supply industries’ liquidity. A supply industry’s liquidity is calculated as supply industry’s 
ratio of total cash reserve to total assets at the last fiscal quarter ending before July 2006, following 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013). I identify an industry’s supply industries based on the BEA 
input-output use table (2002). If a firm’s supply industries hold a higher level of liquidity, then it is more likely 
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to receive trade credit. To test the difference in coefficient estimate on interaction Crisis×Conservatism, the null 
hypothesis is that two subsamples have the same coefficient estimate on Crisis×Conservatism, and the 
alternative hypothesis is that the coefficient estimate of Crisis×Conservatism in the left-hand-side subsample is 
lower than that of right-hand-side subsample. The χ2 statistics and p-values are reported at the bottom of the 
table. All regressions include firm fixed effects to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables 
problem, following Duchin et al. (2010). Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels, and 
T-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Alternative proxies for conditional conservatism 
 
Panel A: Basu (1997) timeliness measure       
  
Total  
sample 
Higher 
suppliers' 
information 
acquisition 
ability 
Higher input 
liquidation 
possibility 
Higher 
financing 
frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crisis -0.005 0.006 -0.016 -0.015 
 (-0.34) (0.24) (-1.16) (-1.01) 
Crisis × Conservatism -0.009 -0.024* -0.011 -0.017** 
 (-1.44) (-1.80) (-1.53) (-1.99) 
Cash holding 0.014 -0.067 -0.082 -0.304** 
 (0.16) (-0.30) (-1.36) (-2.36) 
Market share -0.003 0.024 0.038 -0.114 
 (-0.03) (0.20) (0.33) (-1.22) 
Sales growth -0.013 -0.011 -0.017 -0.074** 
 (-0.42) (-0.26) (-1.02) (-2.52) 
Profit margin 0.009 0.008 0.013*** 0.019* 
 
(1.63) (1.26) (3.40) (1.76) 
Size -0.043 0.033 0.005 0.032 
 
(-1.00) (0.53) (0.13) (1.06) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.13) (-0.39) (-1.40) (-0.74) 
Leverage -0.074 -0.046* -0.029 0.008 
 
(-1.46) (-1.71) (-0.65) (0.65) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12946 4265 6263 5786 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796 0.781 0.796 0.806 
Panel B: Accumulated non-operating accruals     
  
Total  
sample 
Higher 
suppliers' 
information 
acquisition 
ability 
Higher input 
liquidation 
possibility 
Higher 
financing 
frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crisis 0.003 0.034 0.006 0.002 
 (0.16) (1.45) (0.27) (0.10) 
Crisis × Conservatism -0.126 -0.481** -0.137** -0.243*** 
 (-1.24) (-2.45) (-2.05) (-3.12) 
Cash holding -0.000 -0.092 -0.045 -0.214 
 (-0.00) (-0.34) (-0.42) (-0.96) 
Market share -0.010 -0.070 0.018 -0.009 
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 (-0.12) (-1.06) (0.23) (-0.22) 
Sales growth -0.035 -0.021 -0.049 -0.050 
 (-1.56) (-0.81) (-1.11) (-1.46) 
Profit margin 0.005 0.002 0.026* 0.011 
 
(1.15) (0.24) (1.76) (1.35) 
Size -0.062 -0.031 -0.033 -0.017 
 
(-1.49) (-1.02) (-0.50) (-0.53) 
Market to book 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.43) (0.27) (-0.16) (0.81) 
Leverage -0.155* -0.014 -0.096 0.002 
 
(-1.84) (-0.62) (-1.13) (0.16) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6920 2322 3336 3133 
Adjusted R-squared 0.814 0.880 0.816 0.869 
This table presents the regression estimates using the alternative proxies for accounting conservatism. Panel A 
uses Basu timeliness measure as the proxy for conservatism (Basu, 1997), which is based on the firm-specific 
time-series regression between 1996 and 2005 (with minimum of 7 years of observations). Panel B uses the 
accumulated non-operating accruals as the proxy for conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000), which is calculated 
as the accumulated non-operating accruals between 2003 and 2005, scaled by the accumulated total assets, and 
multiply by negative one. A higher value of Basu timelines measure or accumulated non-operating accruals 
represents a higher level of accounting conservatism. The dependent variable is trade credit, which is calculated 
as accounts payable scaled by purchase. The sample ranges from July 2006 to June 2008, and the post-crisis 
period is defined as between July 2007 and June 2008. Column 1 use the total sample, Column 2 uses the 
subsample with higher suppliers’ information acquisition ability, which is measured as the proportion of total 
intermediate inputs to total outputs. Column 3 uses the subsample with higher input liquidation possibility. 
Column 4 uses the subsample with higher financing frictions, which is measured as the Kaplan-Zingales index. 
All regressions include firm fixed effects to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables problem, 
following Duchin et al. (2010). Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels, and T-statistics 
are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.9: Subsample analysis based on customers' bargaining power 
 
  
Industrial competition 
 (Compustat) 
  Industrial competition  
(Census) 
  Industrial competition  
(Hoberg&Phillips, 2010) 
 
High Low 
 
High Low 
 
High Low 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Crisis -0.011 0.036* 
 
0.011 0.009 
 
0.013 0.013 
 (-0.46) (1.77) 
 
(0.53) (0.34) 
 
(0.49) (0.75) 
Crisis × Conservatism 0.013 -0.540*** 
 
0.032 -0.603 
 
-0.192 -0.335* 
 (0.14) (-2.63) 
 
(0.21) (-1.34) 
 
(-1.23) (-1.67) 
Cash holding 0.147 0.013 
 
0.071 -0.397** 
 
0.240* -0.161*** 
 (1.16) (0.14) 
 
(0.47) (-2.51) 
 
(1.75) (-2.70) 
Market share -0.092 0.009 
 
0.001 0.058 
 
0.389 0.016 
 (-0.59) (0.12) 
 
(0.01) (0.19) 
 
(1.02) (0.18) 
Sales growth -0.041 -0.026 
 
0.061 -0.107*** 
 
-0.036 -0.042*** 
 (-0.92) (-0.52) 
 
(1.02) (-2.80) 
 
(-0.72) (-2.87) 
Profit margin 0.012 0.010 
 
-0.009 0.015 
 
0.013 -0.058 
 
(1.13) (0.78) 
 
(-0.82) (1.21) 
 
(1.50) (-1.07) 
Size -0.006 -0.030 
 
-0.038 0.102 
 
-0.089** 0.061 
 
(-0.27) (-0.61) 
 
(-1.28) (1.41) 
 
(-2.33) (1.55) 
Market to book 0.001 -0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.52) (-0.02) 
 
(0.22) (0.22) 
 
(1.20) (-0.78) 
Leverage 0.002 -0.087 
 
0.006 0.026 
 
-0.117** 0.028** 
 
(0.22) (-1.22) 
 
(0.47) (0.54) 
 
(-1.98) (1.99) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 6614 6616 
 
3395 3393 
 
6010 6020 
Adjusted R-squared 0.646 0.855 
 
0.690 0.575 
 
0.778 0.680 
Difference in coefficient on  9.09 
 
1.49 
 
0.14 
Crisis × Conservatism (0.002)   (0.111)   (0.355) 
This table presents the subsample estimates based on customers’ bargaining power. The bargaining power is 
measured as customer industry’s product market competition level prior to July 2006. A firm that operates in a 
less competitive industry usually has a higher level of bargaining power. Column 1 and 2 use the Compustat 
based Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure industry competition, and it is calculated using the largest 
50 firms in each 4-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industries at the end of 2005. Column 3 and 4 
use the U.S. census based HHI in 2002, which is from Ali et al. (2009). Column 5 and 6 use the fitted HHI from 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010). The dependent variable is trade credit, which is calculated as accounts payable 
scaled by purchase. Accounting conservatism is measured as the C_Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009), 
and I take three-year average between 2003 and 2005 to mitigate measurement errors. The sample ranges from 
July 2006 to June 2008, and the post-crisis period is defined as between July 2007 and June 2008. To test the 
difference in coefficient estimate for interaction Crisis×Conservatism, the null hypothesis is that two 
subsamples have the same coefficient estimate for Crisis×Conservatism, and the alternative hypothesis is that 
the coefficient estimate of Crisis×Conservatismin the “high” competition subsample is smaller than that of “low” 
competition subsample. The χ2 statistics and p-values are reported at the bottom of the table. All regressions 
include firm fixed effects to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables problem, following Duchin 
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et al. (2010). Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year-quarter levels, and T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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2. Do Suppliers Value Socially Responsible Customers? 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an increasingly important part of 
business operation in recent years. Many firms around the world invest resources into socially 
responsible activities. 11  Governments, non-governmental organizations, and educational 
institutions also advocate the importance of CSR.12
Previous studies mainly address two viewpoints on the merits of CSR activities. Some 
researchers argue that CSR activities can improve firms’ financial performance, referring to 
the phrase “doing well by doing good” (Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011; Edmans, 2011; Goss 
and Roberts, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013).
 However, the merits of CSR activities 
are still in debate.  
13
It is worth to note that, most prior studies investigate CSR activities from the perspective 
of shareholders or debt holders. However, non-financial stakeholders could also respond to 
firms’ CSR activities. In this paper, we address one specific non-financial stakeholder, 
suppliers. We investigate suppliers’ response to customer firms’ CSR activities by examining 
 In contrast, another stream of studies 
attribute CSR activities to the outcome of agency conflict and managerial entrenchment 
(Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Surroca and Tribó, 2008; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky, 2014), that is, managers could engage in CSR activities at the expense of 
shareholders’ wealth.  
                                                             
11 According to a survey by The Economist, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is rising sharply in corporate executives’ 
priorities. For more details, see http://www.economist.com/node/10491077#sthash.Z1yWMJdj.dpbs. 
12 For instance, the Global Compact (UNGC) and Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) of United Nations 
encourage firms to adopt socially responsible policies. For more details, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ and 
http://www.unido.org/. Many business schools, such as Harvard Business School, also incorporate corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) into their executive education programs, see http://www.exed.hbs.edu/programs/csr/Pages/default.aspx. 
13 For instance, previous studies find that CSR activities have a positive influence on shareholder value (e.g., Jiao, 2010; 
Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013), financing contracts (e.g., Goss and Roberts, 2011; Kim, Surroca, and Tribó, 
2014), and firm risk (e.g., Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali, 2013). 
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whether socially responsible customers are more likely to receive trade credit from suppliers.  
Trade credit is offered by suppliers accompanied with product market transactions. 
When a customer firm purchases goods on credit from suppliers, it records accounts payable 
(AP) in the balance sheet. Trade credit is an important financing substitute other than bank 
loans and equity financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Since 
trade credit usually has short maturity,14 it is especially helpful for firms to overcome 
liquidity constraints (Wilner, 2000; Cuñat, 2007; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 
2013).15
Second, socially responsible firms accumulate social capital through CSR activities, 
which provide “insurance-like” protection and make it less fragile for unexpected external 
shock (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009).
  
We expect that suppliers are more willing to provide trade credit to socially responsible 
customers because of two reasons: First, CSR activities are highly valued by individual 
consumers, therefore socially responsible firms are usually rewarded with high revenue 
growth (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010; Jiao, 2010). By providing trade credit to 
socially responsible customers, suppliers can build good customer-supplier relationship and 
capture future business. 
16
                                                             
14 The duration of trade credit is between one month and four months. Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) describe a typical trade 
credit contract “2-10 net 30”, they interpret it as “the net or full purchase price is due in 30 days, and a 2% discount is 
obtained if payment occurs within 10 days after the sales”. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) summarize 30,000 trade 
credit contracts from 56 large customers, they find the average duration is two months, and the maximum duration is four 
months. 
 By providing trade credit to socially 
responsible customers, suppliers are less likely to face significant default risk and cash flow 
15 In our sample between 2004 and 2010, accounts payable accounts for almost 60% of total purchase, which implies that 
trade credit is an important financing tool for short-term liquidity. It is worth to note that, trade credit become more 
important during the liquidity shock. For instance, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) find cash-rich suppliers 
provide more trade credit to their customer firms during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
16 Furthermore, socially responsible firms care more about the long term interests of stakeholders, consequently these firms 
usually take less risk in the business operation (Bae, Kang, and wang, 2011; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali, 2013). 
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losses. 
We employ a customer-supplier pairs sample of U.S. firms to test whether socially 
responsible customers receive more trade credit.17 The sample ranges from 2004 through 
2010. Customers’ social performance is proxied by the CSR rating score in the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database (now part of MSCI).18
We also investigate customers’ trade credit during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. 
The results show that, when a socially responsible customer is less financially constrained, it 
uses less trade credit during the financial crisis. The above finding suggests that, socially 
responsible customers also provide support to their suppliers when the latter face liquidity 
 Customers’ trade credit 
(accounts payable) and other controlling variables are collected from Compustat quarterly 
industry file.  
We find evidence that socially responsible customers are more likely to receive trade 
credit from suppliers. The above finding still holds after controlling for the characteristics of 
both suppliers and customers. We also use instrumental variable regression and propensity 
score matching to address the endogeneity concern, the results are qualitatively similar.  
To explore the underlying mechanism, we further test the moderating role of customer 
industry’s consumer perception and supplier’s risk exposure, respectively. The results show 
that, when a socially responsible customer operates in an industry with high level of 
consumer perception, or when its supplier is exposed to high level of risk in the 
customer-supplier relationship, the customer is likely to receive more trade credit. 
                                                             
17 The customer-supplier pairs sample allows us to control for the characteristics of both suppliers and customers, which 
alleviate endogeneity concern stemming from omitted variables. 
18 This database has been widely used in previous studies, such as Jiao (2010), Bae, Kang, and Wang (2011), Deng, Kang, 
and Low (2013), and Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014). 
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shock. 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on CSR activities. Previous studies 
investigate CSR activities mainly from the perspective of financial stakeholders (Jiao, 2010; 
Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). Our study shows that suppliers, as non-financial 
stakeholders, also respond to customer firm’s CSR activities by offering trade credit. 
Therefore, socially responsible customers can obtain extra benefits from suppliers, which is 
consistent with the phrase “doing well by doing good”. 
Our paper also contributes to the studies on the determinants of trade credit. Previous 
studies identify several determinants of trade credit, such as credit worthiness, financial 
constraint, growth opportunity, and market power.19
2.2 Hypotheses development 
 Our study shows that firms’ social 
performance is another factor that affects trade credit, which further deepens our 
understanding on trade credit. 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 introduces the sample, methodology, variables, and summary statistics. Section 4 
reports the main regression results. Section 5 tests the underlying mechanisms. Section 6 
presents the additional analyses. Section 7 concludes. 
We expect that suppliers are more willing to provide trade credit to socially responsible 
customers. We propose the hypothesis based on two arguments, they are suppliers’ incentive 
to capture future business and their risk management concern, respectively. 
2.1 Suppliers’ incentive to capture future business 
                                                             
19 Petersen and Rajan (1997), Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011), and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) provide 
extensive review of existing theories of trade credit. 
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Previous studies find socially responsible firms are usually rewarded with high revenue 
growth and firm value. Using a sample of charitable contributions by U.S. firms, Lev, 
Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan (2010) find corporate philanthropy is significantly associated 
with future revenue growth, and they attribute the above finding to the increased customer 
satisfaction. Using the dataset from KLD database, Jiao (2010) finds socially responsible 
firms tend to have higher firm value. 
A supplier’s future performance, to a large extent, depends on the growth of its major 
customers. Promising customers with high growth rate are the source of future business for 
suppliers. Petersen and Rajan (1997) even argue that suppliers hold “implicit equity stake” 
over customers. Therefore, considering the high growth rate associated with CSR activities, 
suppliers have incentive to build long-term relationship with socially responsible customers. 
Offering trade credit can be an effective way for a supplier to build good relationship 
with its customers (Wilner, 2000). Kim and Shin (2012) argue that trade credit work as the 
“glue” to tie firms together in the customer-supplier relationship. Taken togerther, we expect 
that, suppliers are more willing to provide trade credit to socially responsible customers, as a 
way to capture future business. 
2.2 Suppliers’ risk management concern 
The major customers not only draw growth opportunity to suppliers, but also make 
suppliers exposed to potential risk. The unexpected shock to a customer has direct impact on 
its suppliers (Hertzel et al., 2008; Raddatz, 2010). Hertzel et al. (2008) analyze the 
transmission of bankruptcy along the customer-supplier relationship. They find that, when a 
customer declares bankruptcy, its suppliers are also negatively affected.  
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Trade credit plays an importance role in the transmission of a shock along the 
customer-supplier relationship. Since a supplier cannot force its customers to repay debt 
during bankruptcy, the use of trade credit significantly amply the transmission of a shock 
along the supply chain (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Raddatz, 2010).  
Furthermore, a supplier also has direct incentive to reduce its credit risk when offering 
trade credit to its customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2012).20
CSR activities can provide firms with “insurance-like” protection over negative events. 
Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) argue that, by engaging in socially responsible activities, 
a firm can improve its social capital, and send signal to outside stakeholders. Once suffering 
from negative events, the socially responsible firms would be less penalized by 
stakeholders.
 
Although, compared to other debt holders, suppliers can evaluate and monitor the credit risk 
of customers with relatively lower costs (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004), they are unable to completely eliminate it. 
21
H1: Socially responsible customers are more likely to receive trade credit from 
 Kim, Li, and Li (2014) also find that a firm’s social performance can mitigate 
the stock price crash risk, which is consistent with the argument of “insurance-like” 
protection.  
Therefore, by offering more trade credit to socially responsible customers, a supplier can 
reduce the risk in the customer-supplier relationship. Summarizing the above two arguments, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
                                                             
20 Petersen and Rajan (1997) find suppliers provide more trade credit to credit worthy customers. Klapper, Laeven, and 
Rajan (2012) also find suppliers consider the credit risk of customers when providing trade credit. 
21 Furthermore, socially responsible firms also take less risk. For instance, Bae, Kang, and Wang (2011) find that, firms that 
credibly commit to satisfy stakeholders’ interests usually maintain lower financial leverage to reduce risk. 
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suppliers. 
2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 Sample 
Our baseline sample (or the whole KLD sample) includes all the non-financial, 
U.S.-incorporated firms covered by KLD database and Compustat industry quarterly file 
between 2004 and 2010. We further collect supplier information from Compustat segment file 
to construct the customer-supplier pairs sample. 
KLD database provides extensive rating for firms’ social performance based on various 
information sources, including corporate filings, government data, non-governmental 
organization data, and media sources. In 1991, it initially covers 650 firms that comprise 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index and KLD 400 social index. Since 2003, it expands to the 3000 
largest U.S. public firms. Selecting 2004 as starting point can provide more variation for the 
social performance across firms.22
We collect trade credit and firm characteristics from Compustat industry quarterly file. 
Trade credit has short maturity (Ng, Smith, and Smith, 1999; Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 
2012).
  
23
                                                             
22 We lag the observations in KLD database by one year to ensure suppliers can observe customer firms’ social performance. 
Consequently, the final sample corresponds to the observations in KLD database between 2003 and 2009. 
23 Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) find the average duration of trade credit are around 60 days, and the maximum 
duration are 120 days. Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) also document a typical trade credit contract with 30 days of duration. 
 Therefore, quarterly observations can better capture the evolution of trade credit. 
Following prior literature, we exclude the firms with negative value of sales or total assets, 
those total assets are less than 10 Million US dollars, those market value are less than 50 
Million US dollars, and those with missing value of accounts payable. The resulting baseline 
sample consists of 41121 firm-quarter level observations, corresponding to 2502 unique 
firms.  
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Based on the Compustat segment file, we further construct the customer-supplier pairs 
sample, which enables us to control for suppliers’ characteristics. The Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 131 requires firms to disclose the major customers whose purchase 
exceed 10% of the firms’ sales revenue.24 By inverting the Compustat segment file, we can 
identify a firm’s supplier, who reports the firm as a major customer. 25
2.3.2 Methodology 
 The resulting 
customer-supplier pairs sample includes 8825 pair-quarter level observations, corresponding 
to 1006 customer-supplier pairs and 281 customer firms. 
To test whether socially responsible firms receive more trade credit, our regression 
specification is written as follows: 
*0 1 2 ,1it it ind i t itit
AP CSR Controlβ β β α α ε
−
= + + + + + .                         (1) 
In equation (1), itAP  refers to the trade credit that firm i use at the end of quarter t, which is 
measured as the accounts payable scaled by purchase (AP/Purchase).26 * 1itCSR −  
refers to 
firms i’s social performance, which is lagged one year to ensure supplier can observe 
customer firms’ social performance. If the hypothesis H1 holds, coefficient 1β  should be 
positive.  
We also include the controls that could influence trade credit. Previous studies explore 
the possible determinants of trade credit, they include firms’ credit worthiness (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997), financial constraint (Cuñat, 2007), growth opportunity (Petersen and Rajan, 
                                                             
24 Some firms voluntarily disclose some small customers even if these customers’ purchase account for less than 10% of the 
firms’ sales revenue. To ensure comparability, we only use the major customers that meet the threshold of 10%. 
25 The reported customers’ names in the Compustat segment file are usually abbreviated. Following Fee and Thomas (2004), 
we use an algorithm and manually check combined method to identify the major customers. First, we find four possible 
matches between the reported customers and the historical names of Compustat firms. Then, we manually check their name, 
industry, and business description to choose the most possible match. In some cases, firms report the name of subsidiaries 
rather than the holding firms. We employ LexisNexis Academic Universe Search to identify whether the reported customers 
are the wholly subsidiaries of Compustat firms. 
26 Here purchase is calculated as cost of goods sold (COGS) plus the change of inventory. To ensure robustness, we also use 
accounts payable scaled by cost of goods sold (AP/COGS) as an alternative measure. 
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1997), and market power (Giannetti, Burkart, and Elingsen, 2011; Klapper, Laeven, and 
Rajan, 2012).  
Trade credit usually follows industry practice (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Ng, Smith, and 
Smith, 1999), so we include industry fixed effect ( ,ind iα ) to control for the time invariant 
industrial factors. Trade credit also changes over time (Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende, 
2007), so we include quarter fixed effect ( tα ) to control for the time varying unobservable 
factors.  
Because trade credit is jointly determined by the characteristics of suppliers and 
customers, omitting characteristics of suppliers could draw endogeneity problem. The 
customer-supplier pairs sample allows us to further control for the characteristics of 
suppliers.27
*0 1 2 3 , ,1it it jt ind i ind j t ijtit
AP CSR Control Controlβ β β β α α α ε
−
= + + + + + + +
 The resulting regression specification can be written as 
,   (2) 
where jtControl  refers to the controls for supplier j at quarter t. We also control for suppler 
j’s industry fixed effect ,ind jα . 
2.3.3 Variables 
We use the CSR score in KLD database to proxy for firms’ social performance. KLD 
database evaluates firms’ social performance based on seven dimensions: community, 
diversity, corporate governance, employee relations, environmental protection, human rights, 
and product quality. Each dimension includes a number of indicators, which is assigned either 
zero or one according to firms’ social performance. Following previous literature, we use six 
                                                             
27 It is worth to note that, one customer could have several suppliers, but we can only observe one aggregated trade credit 
variable for each customer firm, it is actually assuming that a customer receives the same proportion of trade credit from all 
of its suppliers. 
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dimensions excluding corporate governance to calculate the CSR score.28
For asset tangibility, Altman Z-Score, and Kaplan-Zingales index, because quarterly 
  
Since the number of indicators in each dimension varies across years, we follow Bouslah, 
Kryzanowski, and M’Zali (2013) and Deng, Kang, and Low (2013) to calculate the CSR 
score as the ratio of strengths values to the number of strengths indicators. We first calculate 
the CSR score for each dimension, and then add up to obtain the total CSR score.  
Our main controlling variables include credit worthiness, financial constraint, growth 
opportunity, and market power. We introduce the proxies for these controlling variables in 
detail.  
The proxies for credit worthiness include firm size, leverage, asset tangibility, cash 
holding, profit margin, and the probability of financial distress. We use Altman (1968) 
Z-score to proxy for the probability of financial distress, the coefficients are based on 
Mackie-Mason (1990). A higher value of Z-score represents less probability of financial 
distress.  
We use Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index as the proxy for financial constraints. The 
coefficients are from Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). Here a higher value of 
Kaplan-Zingales index represents higher level of financial constraint.  
Firms’ growth opportunity is proxied by sales growth and Tobin’s Q. We calculate firms’ 
sales growth by comparing with the same quarter of last year. A firm’s market power is 
proxied by the firm’s market share. We calculate a firm’s market share based on 3-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
                                                             
28 Di Giuli and Kostovesky (2014) employ the same method. We also use all the seven dimensions (Deng, Kang, and Low, 
2013) and five dimensions excluding human rights (Jiao, 2010) as robustness check, the results are similar. 
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observations are not available, we replace with annual observations. To avoid distortion of 
outliers, we winsorize all the dependent variable and control variables at the 1% and 99% 
level.  
2.3.4 Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables. Panel A reports the 
statistics for the whole KLD sample firms. The mean value of trade credit (AP/Purchase) for 
the sample firms is 0.574. The mean CSR score is 0.169. Panel B reports statistics for the 
customer variables in the customer-supplier pairs sample. The statistics for trade credit are 
similar to that of whole KLD sample. The average CSR score in the customer-supplier pairs 
sample is 0.714, which is higher than that of whole KLD sample. This could be because most 
customers in the customer-supplier pairs sample are big firms, which are more likely to invest 
in CSR activities. 
 [Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
Suppliers and customers in the pairs sample show significant difference. The customers 
are usually bigger than their suppliers, they have higher market share and more tangible 
assets, but the sales growth rate and Tobin’s Q of customers are much lower. Furthermore, the 
Altman Z-score of customers is higher, indicating that customers have less probability of 
financial distress. It is also interesting to find that customers hold less cash and have higher 
level of financial constraints.29
                                                             
29 We also check the statistical significance of the common variables in the customer-supplier pairs sample, all the 
T-statistics are significant. 
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2.4 Main results 
2.4.1 Base results: Customers’ social performance and trade credit 
We first use the whole KLD sample to examine whether socially responsible customer 
receive more trade credit. Column 1 of Table 2.2 reports the estimated results of univariate 
regression, the coefficient estimate of CSR score is 0.156, which is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. After including more controls in column 2-4, the coefficient estimates of CSR 
score are similar. The positive coefficient estimates suggest that socially responsible 
customers receive more trade credit, which is consistent with our hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
We further check the economic significance of our coefficient estimates. Column 4 of 
Table 2.2 includes all the controls, and the coefficient estimate of CSR score is 0.141. This 
coefficient implies that one standard deviation increase of CSR score (0.296, see table 2.1) 
raises the quarterly accounts payable by 4.17% (=0.141*0.296). On annual basis, it raises 
accounts payable by 16.68%, which is economically significant.30
However, the coefficient of leverage is positive, and the coefficient of Altman Z-score is 
  
The coefficients of control variables are consistent with our predictions. Firm size, asset 
tangibility, cash holding, and profit margin have positive coefficients, indicating that credit 
worthy firms receive more trade credit. The coefficient of Kaplan-Zingales index is negative. 
Since a higher value of Kaplan-Zingales index represents higher level of financial constraint, 
the above finding is also consistent with the credit worthiness argument. 
                                                             
30 We also compare the economic significance of CSR score with that of control variables. Among all the controls, only 
Altman Z-score has higher economic significance than CSR score. The change of accounts payable corresponding to one 
standard deviation increase of size, leverage, asset tangibility, cash holding, market share, sales growth rate, profit margin, 
Tobin’s Q, Altman Z-score, and Kaplan-Zingales index are 3.57%, 0.51%, 3.93%, 3.28%, 2.56%, 0.88%, 1.33%, 1.71%, 
7.83%, and 3.04%, respectively. The above results suggest that, compared to other controls, firms’ social performance has 
more significant influence. 
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negative, which is different from our predictions. Since higher Altman Z-score represents 
lower probability of financial distress, the above finding suggest that suppliers are likely to 
offer trade credit to temporarily financially distressed customers, which is consistent with the 
findings of Wilner (2000) and Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007). 
The coefficients of Tobin’s Q are positive, indicating suppliers are willing to provide 
trade credit to customer with growth opportunity. The coefficients of firm market share are 
negative, meaning that the customers with higher market share use less trade credit. This 
could be because the customers with higher market power usually have enough cash to pay 
for the purchase from suppliers. 
2.4.2 Customers’ social performance and trade credit controlling for suppliers’ 
characteristics 
Without supplier controls, our regression specifications is subject to omitted variables 
concerns, which make it difficult to draw correct statistical inference. Employing the 
customer-supplier pairs sample, we can further control for suppliers’ characteristics. 
Table 2.3 reports the estimated results. Column 1 is a univariate regression based on the 
customer-supplier pairs sample, the coefficient estimate of customers’ CSR score is 0.099. 
Column 2 includes customer controls, the coefficient estimate of customers’ CSR score is 
0.156, which is statistically significant. The above findings are similar to that of the whole 
KLD sample, and it suggests that the customer-supplier pairs sample is not subject to serious 
sample selection problem. 
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
In column 3, we further add supplier controls, and the estimated results are very robust. 
The coefficient estimate of customers’ CSR score is 0.146, which is statistically significant at 
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the 1% level. This coefficient implies that, one standard deviation increase of CSR score 
(0.643, see table 2.1) in the customer-supplier pairs sample raises the quarterly accounts 
payable by 9.39% (=0.146*0.643). On annual basis, it raises accounts payable by 37.56%, 
which is double of economic effect in the whole KLD sample. 
2.5 Mechanisms 
In section 2, we propose the main hypothesis based on two arguments: suppliers’ 
incentive to capture future business and suppliers’ risk management concern, respectively. 
These two arguments actually imply two different mechanisms. In this section, we will 
discuss their empirical implications and test the underlying mechanisms. 
2.5.1 Suppliers’ incentive to capture future business 
Since consumers perceive and value firms’ CSR activities, socially responsible firms 
usually achieve higher sales growth (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010; Servaes and 
Tamayo, 2013). Therefore, when a socially responsible customer firm operates in an industry 
with high level of consumer perception, it would be highly rewarded by its consumers and 
suppliers. Consequently, we predict it would receive more trade credit from suppliers. To 
empirically test the above prediction, we introduce the interaction of customer firms’ CSR 
and consumer perception. If our prediction holds, we would observe a positive coefficient of 
the interaction term.  
We use two proxies for consumer perception. The first proxy is an indicator variable for 
individual consumer predominant industry, which takes the value of one if a firm operates in 
an individual consumer predominant industry, and zero otherwise. Compared to industry 
buyers, individual consumers are more sensitive to firms’ CSR activities and social image 
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(Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010). We follow Sharpe (1982) to classify the individual 
consumer predominant industry. 
The second proxy for consumer perception is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm's adverting intensity is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. If an 
industry has a higher level of consumer perception, it tends to invest more on advertisement 
(Fisman, Heal, and Nair, 2006; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). We first calculate the firm-level 
adverting intensity as the scaled advertising expenses by sales revenue, and then calculate the 
industry median advertising intensity. 
Table 2.4 reports the estimated results.31
2.5.2 Suppliers’ risk management concern 
 The first two columns use the indicator of 
individual consumer predominant industry as the proxy for consumer perception, the last two 
columns use advertising intensity as proxy. All the coefficient estimates of interaction terms 
are significantly positive, which is consistent with our prediction. The above findings suggest 
that suppliers’ incentive to capture future business is an underlying mechanism, through 
which customer firms’ social performance influence trade credit. 
 [Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
The second argument is based on suppliers’ risk management concern. To reduce credit 
risk and potential cash flow losses, suppliers provide more trade credit to socially responsible 
customers. It is natural to predict that, when a supplier is exposed to higher level of risk in the 
customer-supplier relationship, it values more its customers’ social performance. To test the 
above prediction, we introduce the interaction of customer firms’ social performance and 
                                                             
31 Because our proxies for consumer perception are industry-level variables, we exclude customers’ industry fixed effects 
from all specifications to avoid potential multi-collinearity problem.  
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suppliers’ risk exposure in the customer-supplier relationship. If the prediction holds, the 
coefficient estimates of interaction term should be positive. 
We use two proxies for suppliers’ risk exposure in the customer-supplier relationship. 
The first proxy is customer firms’ industry competition level. If a customer operates in a 
highly competitive industry, it is more likely to face unexpected bankruptcy risk. The industry 
competition level is measured as the Herfindal-Hirschman index (HHI) calculated based on 
Compustat firms in the 4-digit SIC code. To ensure robustness, we also use the census-based 
HHI in Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2009), the results are qualitatively similar. 
The second proxy is customer importance in the customer-supplier relationship. In the 
customer-supplier pairs sample, a customer’s importance for its supplier is measured as the 
supplier’s sales proportion to this customer. Higher sales proportion implies the supplier 
depends more on the customer. In the whole KLD sample, a customer’s importance is proxied 
by whether the customer is reported as a major customer in the Compustat segment file. If a 
customer is reported as a major customer in the correspondent period, this customer can be 
viewed as an important customer for its suppliers. 
Table 2.5 reports the estimated results. The first two columns use customers’ industry 
competition as proxy. The last two columns use customer importance as proxy. The 
coefficient estimates of interaction terms in all the four columns are significantly positive. 
The results mean that, when suppliers are exposed to high level of risk in the 
customer-supplier relationship, the customers’ social performance has more pronounced 
influence on trade credit. The above findings suggest that, suppliers’ risk management 
concern is another underlying mechanism for the relationship between customers’ social 
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performance and trade credit. 
 [Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
2.6 Additional analyses 
2.6.1 Endogeneity issue 
Our main regression might be subject to reverse causality concern and omitted variables 
bias, which draw potential endogeneity issue. First, the customers that receive trade credit 
could have more resources to invest in CSR activities, resulting in reverse causality concern. 
Second, some unobservable characteristics that are related to firms’ social performance might 
be omitted in our regression, which could make our coefficient estimates biased.   
In this section, we adopt instrumental variable regression (or two-stage least square 
regression) and propensity score matching to alleviate the endogeneity concerns. We choose 
two instrumental variables for firms’ social performance.  
The first instrumental variable is firms’ external political environment. Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014) find that, the U.S. firms that are more influenced by the Democratic 
Party are more likely to engage in CSR activities. Following Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), 
we define a firm’s external political environment as the proportion of votes received by the 
Democratic candidate for president in election 2012 (i.e., Barack Obama) in the state where 
the firm is headquartered. 
The second instrumental variable is the industry median social performance. This 
instrumental variable is already used in previous studies (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011). To 
obtain more variation of observations, we calculate the industry median CSR score based on 
the whole KLD sample rather than the customer-supplier pairs sample. 
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The results for instrumental variable regression are reported in Table 2.6. The regression 
results are qualitatively similar to that of our main regressions. The coefficients of 
instrumented social performance are a little bigger, but they are still statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The above findings suggest that our main regression results are not subject to 
serious endogeneity concern.  
 [Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
We also use propensity score matching (PSM) to alleviate the endogeneity problem. We 
first partition the sample into high CSR group and low CSR group based on the sample 
median CSR score. Then, we calculate the predicted propensity score, and identify the 
matched firm in the high CSR group for each firm in the low CSR group.  
Table 2.7 reports the results. In the whole KLD sample, the average trade credit of high 
CSR group is 0.597, while that of low CSR group is 0.562, and the difference 0.035 is 
statistically significant with the P-value of 0.054. The results based on the customer-supplier 
pairs sample are also similar. The above findings suggest that, compared to low CSR group, 
the high CSR group receives more trade credit. 
 [Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
2.6.2 The influence of social performance during the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
In this sub-section, we investigate whether socially responsible customers use more 
trade credit during the financial crisis. Following Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), we 
analyze using the difference-in-difference (DID) approach. The variable of interest is the 
interaction of customers’ social performance and crisis indicator. The sample ranges from the 
third quarter of 2005 to the second quarter of 2008. The crisis period is defined as the period 
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from the third quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2008. Firms’ social performance is 
measured at the end of year 2005.32
To further explore the underlying rationale, we partition the whole KLD sample into two 
sub-samples based on firms’ financial constraint.
 
Panel A of Table 2.8 reports the estimated results for the total sample. The coefficients of 
interaction terms are significantly negative in all specifications, which imply that socially 
responsible customers use less trade credit during the financial crisis.  
[Insert Table 2.8 about here] 
33
2.6.3 Results for different CSR dimensions and industries 
 We use four proxies for financial 
constraint, including Kaplan-Zingales index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), Whited-Wu index 
(Whited and Wu, 2006), Size-Age index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), and bank line of credit 
(Sufi, 2009). The results show that, when a socially responsible customer is less financially 
constrained (Panel B), it uses significantly less trade credit. However, when it is more 
financially constrained (Panel C), its trade credit doesn’t show significant changes during the 
financial crisis. 
The CSR score is calculated based on six dimensions of CSR rating in the KLD database. 
In this section, we regress over each CSR dimension to compare their relative importance. 
The estimated results are reported in Panel A of Table 2.9. Among the six dimensions, five 
dimensions including community, diversity, environmental protection, human rights, and 
product quality have significant influence on trade credit. However, the coefficient estimate 
                                                             
32 Firm fixed effects are included in the specifications for the whole KLD sample, pair fixed effects are included in the 
specifications for the customer-supplier pairs sample. 
33 The difference-in-difference approach requires balanced panel observations. As a result, our sample observations are 
significantly reduced. Therefore, in the sub-sample regressions of Panel B and Panel C, we only use the whole KLD sample 
rather than the customer-supplier pairs sample. 
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of employee relationship is not statistically significant, although it is positive. 
We also examine the influence of firms’ social performance in different industries. 
Based on the Fama-French five industries classification, we partition the whole KLD sample 
into five sub-samples.34
2.7 Conclusion 
 Firms’ social performance show significant influence on trade credit 
in the industry consumer goods (Cnsmr), manufacturing (Manuf), high technology (HiTec), 
and health care (Hlth). However, the coefficient estimate in the other industry is negative. 
 [Insert Table 2.9 about here] 
Firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) has drawn lots of attention from both 
academia and practitioners in recent years. However, the merits of firms’ CSR activities are 
still in debate. We contribute to prior studies by examining whether socially responsible 
customers are more likely to receive trade credit from suppliers. 
Based on a customer-supplier pairs sample, we find that socially responsible customers 
receive more trade credit. This relationship is more pronounced when a customer operates in 
an industry with high level of consumer perception, or when its supplier is exposed to high 
level of risk in the customer-supplier relationship. The above findings indicate that suppliers 
are willing to provide trade credit to socially responsible customers, either to capture future 
business or to reduce risk. 
Our findings suggest that suppliers value socially responsible customers. By engaging in 
CSR activities, firms can obtain extra benefit from suppliers, which is consistent with the 
phrase “doing well by doing good”. Furthermore, our study also shows that firms’ social 
                                                             
34 The Fama-French five industry classification is collected from the data library of Kenneth R. French. For detailed 
information, see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_5_ind_port.html. 
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performance is an important determinant of trade credit, which complements previous studies 
on trade credit.  
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Appendix A. Correlation matrix the main independent variables in the whole KLD sample 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) 
CSR (a) 1 
          
Size (b) 0.51 1 
         
Leverage (c) 0.02 0.30 1 
        
Asset tangibility (d) 0.04 0.25 0.26 1 
       
Cash holding (e) -0.08 -0.46 -0.34 -0.35 1 
      
Market share (f) 0.20 0.37 0.08 -0.01 -0.24 1 
     
Sales growth (g) -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.17 -0.07 1 
    
Profit margin (h) 0.05 0.14 -0.05 0.04 -0.26 0.06 -0.05 1 
   
Tobin's Q (i) 0.00 -0.30 -0.19 -0.18 0.44 -0.10 0.20 -0.11 1 
  
Altman Z-score (j) 0.06 0.17 -0.20 0.01 -0.33 0.20 -0.20 0.30 -0.12 1 
 
Kaplan-Zingales index (k) 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.28 -0.31 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.24 -0.03 1 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the main variables. Panel A reports the statistics for the whole 
KLD sample, which is based on the firm-quarter level observations from 2004 to 2010. Panel B and Panel C 
report statistics for the customer-supplier pairs sample, which is based on the pair-quarter level observations 
from 2004 to 2010. Panel B and Panel C correspond to the statistics for customer variables and supplier 
variables, respectively. 
 
  No. of observations Mean Median Std. dev. 
Panel A: The whole KLD sample 
Trade credit 41121 0.574  0.419  0.702  
CSR 41121 0.169  0.000  0.296  
Size 41121 6.914  6.739  1.552  
Leverage 41121 0.207  0.179  0.206  
Asset tangibility 41121 0.297  0.227  0.237  
Cash holding 41121 0.194  0.108  0.212  
Market share 41121 0.063  0.011  0.125  
Sales growth 41121 0.172  0.093  0.589  
Profit margin 41121 -0.264  0.052  2.678  
Tobin's Q 41121 2.100  1.676  1.316  
Altman Z-score 41121 1.563  1.788  2.010  
Kaplan-Zingales index 41121 -4.834  -0.874  15.216  
     Panel B: Customer variables in the customer-supplier pairs sample 
Trade credit 8825 0.681  0.485  0.588  
CSR 8825 0.714  0.518  0.643  
Size 8825 9.795  10.120  1.163  
Leverage 8825 0.186  0.168  0.125  
Asset tangibility 8825 0.297  0.197  0.226  
Cash holding 8825 0.118  0.075  0.125  
Market share 8825 0.221  0.171  0.189  
Sales growth 8825 0.111  0.080  0.304  
Profit margin 8825 0.056  0.051  0.280  
Tobin's Q 8825 1.929  1.703  0.911  
Altman Z-score 8825 2.560  2.425  1.466  
Kaplan-Zingales index 8825 -3.235  -1.726  6.251  
     Panel C: Supplier variables in the customer-supplier pairs sample 
Size 8825 6.261  6.028  1.654  
Leverage 8825 0.186  0.135  0.203  
Asset tangibility 8825 0.236  0.161  0.222  
Cash holding 8825 0.263  0.198  0.239  
Market share 8825 0.034  0.002  0.094  
Sales growth 8825 0.231  0.102  0.745  
Profit margin 8825 -0.331  0.040  2.521  
Tobin's Q 8825 2.186  1.736  1.412  
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Altman Z-score 8825 0.926  1.465  2.585  
Kaplan-Zingales index 8825 -5.865  -1.211  17.103  
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Table 2.2: Customers’ social performance and trade credit 
 
This table presents the estimated results from regression of customer firms’ trade credit on social 
performance. The regressions are based on the whole KLD sample between 2004 and 2010. The dependent 
variable is trade credit, which is measured as accounts payable scaled by purchase (AP\Purchase). Firms’ 
social performance is proxied by the CSR score calculated based on the KLD database. Column 1 is a 
univariate regression, column 2 adds firm size, leverage, asset tangibility, cash holding, sales growth, and 
profit margin as controls, column 3 includes Tobin’s Q, and column 4 further includes Altman Z-score and 
Kaplan-Zingales index. All specifications include 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects and quarter fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at quarter level, and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.151*** 0.141*** 
 
(14.24) (14.59) (14.53) (14.23) 
Size 
 
0.013*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 
  
(6.00) (7.12) (9.96) 
Leverage 
 
0.124*** 0.123*** 0.025 
  
(6.17) (6.00) (1.25) 
Asset tangibility 
 
0.142*** 0.140*** 0.166*** 
  
(6.29) (6.19) (7.44) 
Cash holding 
 
0.307*** 0.282*** 0.155*** 
  
(11.03) (9.83) (5.05) 
Market share 
 
-0.194*** -0.203*** -0.205*** 
  
(-11.28) (-11.76) (-11.43) 
Sales growth 
 
0.003 0.000 -0.015 
  
(0.29) (0.02) (-1.35) 
Profit margin 
 
0.001 0.001 0.005** 
  
(0.54) (0.51) (2.22) 
Tobin's Q 
  
0.012*** 0.013*** 
   
(4.19) (4.78) 
Altman Z-score 
   
-0.039*** 
    
(-19.01) 
Kaplan-Zingales index 
   
-0.002*** 
    
(-4.78) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.325*** 0.111** 0.0799* 0.118** 
 
(8.18) (2.51) (1.81) (2.70) 
Observations 41121 41121 41121 41121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.176 0.182 0.183 0.190 
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Table 2.3: Customers’ social performance and trade credit controlling for suppliers’ characteristics 
 
  This table presents the estimated results from regression of customer firms’ trade credit on social 
performance after controlling for suppliers’ characteristics. The regressions are based on the 
customer-supplier pairs sample between 2004 and 2010. The dependent variable is customer firms’ trade 
credit scaled by purchase (AP/Purchase). Customer firms’ social performance is proxied by the CSR score in 
the KLD database. Column 1 is a univariate regression, column 2 includes customer controls, and column 3 
further adds supplier controls. All specifications in column 1 and 2 include customers’ industry fixed effects 
and quarter fixed effects, column 3 further include suppliers’ industry fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at quarter level, and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Customers’ CSR 0.099*** 0.156*** 0.146*** 
 
(5.07) (4.53) (4.24) 
Customer variables 
   
Size 
 
0.045*** 0.042** 
  
(2.88) (2.75) 
Leverage 
 
-0.232* -0.165 
  
(-1.84) (-1.28) 
Asset tangibility 
 
0.834*** 0.889*** 
  
(6.42) (6.55) 
Cash holding 
 
0.592** 0.524** 
  
(2.34) (2.12) 
Market share 
 
-0.926*** -0.944*** 
  
(-14.71) (-15.24) 
Sales growth 
 
-0.052 -0.045 
  
(-1.05) (-0.89) 
Profit margin 
 
0.118*** 0.120*** 
  
(3.28) (3.41) 
Tobin's Q 
 
-0.036*** -0.034*** 
  
(-3.50) (-3.49) 
Altman Z-score 
 
-0.101*** -0.105*** 
  
(-7.13) (-7.12) 
Kaplan-Zingales index 
 
-0.007*** -0.007*** 
  
(-3.08) (-3.05) 
Supplier variables 
   
Size 
  
0.015*** 
   
(5.00) 
Leverage 
  
-0.046 
   
(-1.50) 
Asset tangibility 
  
0.080** 
   
(2.59) 
Cash holding 
  
0.038 
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(1.32) 
Market share 
  
0.039 
   
(0.94) 
Sales growth 
  
-0.023*** 
   
(-3.73) 
Profit margin 
  
0.002 
   
(0.63) 
Tobin's Q 
  
-0.007* 
   
(-1.77) 
Altman Z-score 
  
0.000 
   
(0.16) 
Kaplan-Zingales index 
  
-0.000 
   
(-0.03) 
Customers’ industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Suppliers’ industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.064*** 0.0530 0.189 
 
(11.12) (0.49) (1.21) 
Observations 8825 8825 8825 
Adjusted R-squared 0.258 0.317 0.338 
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Table 2.4: The moderating role of customer industry’ consumer perception 
 
  This table presents the estimated results for the moderating role of customer industry’ consumer perception. 
The dependent variable is customers’ trade credit scaled by purchase (AP/Purchase). Customers’ social 
performance is proxied by the CSR score in the KLD database. The variable of interest is the interaction of 
customers’ social performance and customer industry’s consumer perception. We use two proxies for 
consumer perception: (A) indicator of individual consumer predominant industry, and (B) advertising 
intensity, which correspond to column 1-2 and 3-4, respectively. The sample runs from 2004 through 2010, 
column 1 and 3 are based on the whole KLD sample, while column 2 and 4 are based on the 
customer-supplier pairs sample. Because customer industry’s consumer perception is an industry-level 
variable, we exclude customers’ industry fixed effects from all specifications. Column 1 and 3 include quarter 
fixed effects, column 2 and 4 further add suppliers’ industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
quarter level, and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Proxies for consumer perception 
 
(A) Indicator of consumer 
industry 
(B) Advertising 
intensity 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customers’ CSR 0.017 0.031 -0.061*** -0.057*** 
 
(1.11) (1.07) (-4.15) (-3.10) 
Customer industry's consumer perception -0.112*** -0.122*** -0.047*** -0.070*** 
 
(-14.61) (-4.37) (-4.28) (-3.88) 
Customers’ CSR × Customer industry's consumer 
perception 
0.167*** 0.205*** 0.251*** 0.237*** 
 
(8.07) (4.52) (13.62) (6.88) 
Customer variables 
    
Size 0.035*** 0.023* 0.044*** 0.043*** 
 
(17.74) (1.81) (21.55) (3.18) 
Leverage -0.109*** 0.005 -0.173*** -0.101 
 
(-6.52) (0.05) (-11.54) (-0.86) 
Asset tangibility 0.383*** 0.439*** 0.489*** 0.464*** 
 
(14.73) (7.00) (14.68) (7.13) 
Cash holding 0.086*** 0.006 0.081** 0.211 
 
(2.95) (0.03) (2.73) (1.10) 
Market share -0.359*** -0.769*** -0.453*** -0.805*** 
 
(-28.13) (-12.45) (-31.84) (-11.99) 
Sales growth 0.018 -0.027 0.016 -0.026 
 
(1.38) (-0.52) (1.16) (-0.48) 
Profit margin 0.003 0.097*** 0.012*** 0.104*** 
 
(1.42) (3.19) (5.92) (3.36) 
Tobin's Q 0.017*** -0.057*** 0.013*** -0.064*** 
 
(5.54) (-4.87) (3.97) (-4.80) 
Altman Z-score -0.050*** -0.094*** -0.058*** -0.096*** 
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(-24.44) (-11.27) (-28.10) (-11.57) 
Kaplan-Zingales index -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.008*** 
 
(-6.15) (-4.60) (-6.70) (-4.23) 
Supplier variables 
    
Size 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.024*** 
  
(5.85) 
 
(5.99) 
Leverage 
 
-0.087** 
 
-0.068** 
  
(-2.37) 
 
(-2.06) 
Asset tangibility 
 
0.036 
 
0.113** 
  
(0.84) 
 
(2.16) 
Cash holding 
 
0.009 
 
0.019 
  
(0.32) 
 
(0.63) 
Market share 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.045 
  
(-0.40) 
 
(-0.94) 
Sales growth 
 
-0.025*** 
 
-0.025*** 
  
(-3.53) 
 
(-3.87) 
Profit margin 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
  
(1.01) 
 
(1.12) 
Tobin's Q 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
  
(-0.73) 
 
(-0.38) 
Altman Z-score 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.005 
  
(-1.58) 
 
(-1.56) 
Kaplan-Zingales index 
 
-0.000** 
 
-0.000** 
  
(-2.35) 
 
(-2.30) 
Customers’ industry fixed effects No No No No 
Suppliers’ industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.255*** 0.588*** 0.188*** 0.587*** 
 
(14.34) (4.06) (9.99) (3.79) 
Observations 41121 8825 37577 8453 
Adjusted R-squared 0.055 0.242 0.059 0.262 
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Table 2.5: The moderating role of suppliers’ risk exposure 
 
  This table presents the estimated results for the moderating role of suppliers’ risk exposure. The dependent 
variable is customers’ trade credit scaled by purchase (AP/Purchase). Customers’ social performance is 
proxied by the CSR score in the KLD database. The variable of interest is the interaction of customers’ social 
performance and suppliers’ risk exposure. We use two proxies for suppliers’ risk exposure: (A) customers’ 
industry competition, and (B) customer importance. The sample runs from 2004 through 2010, column 1 and 
3 are based on the whole KLD sample, column 2 and 4 use the customer-supplier pairs sample. Because 
customers’ industry competition is an industry-level variable, we exclude customers’ industry fixed effects 
from the specifications in column 1 and 2. Column 1 only includes quarter fixed effects, column 2 adds 
suppliers’ industry fixed effects, column 3 includes both quarter fixed effects and customers’ industry fixed 
effects, while column 4 further includes suppliers’ industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
quarter level, and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Proxies for suppliers’ risk exposure 
 
(A) Customers’ industry 
competition 
(B) Customer  
importance 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customers’ CSR 0.062*** 0.040 0.121*** 0.116*** 
 
(6.40) (1.37) (9.20) (3.43) 
Suppliers’ risk exposure -0.038* -0.070*** 0.050*** -0.028** 
 
(-1.78) (-4.19) (6.84) (-2.45) 
Customers’ CSR × Suppliers’ risk exposure 0.037*** 0.054*** 0.025* 0.052*** 
 
(2.86) (2.81) (1.90) (3.94) 
Customer variables 
    
Size 0.040*** 0.032** 0.017*** 0.043*** 
 
(16.87) (2.32) (7.50) (2.82) 
Leverage -0.141*** 0.010 0.033 -0.155 
 
(-8.34) (0.09) (1.64) (-1.20) 
Asset tangibility 0.403*** 0.490*** 0.165*** 0.893*** 
 
(14.89) (7.09) (7.36) (6.54) 
Cash holding 0.095** -0.022 0.149*** 0.536** 
 
(2.69) (-0.14) (4.77) (2.17) 
Market share -0.433*** -0.787*** -0.205*** -0.937*** 
 
(-18.59) (-12.01) (-11.24) (-15.08) 
Sales growth 0.015 -0.033 -0.015 -0.045 
 
(1.20) (-0.62) (-1.36) (-0.90) 
Profit margin 0.005** 0.111*** 0.005** 0.119*** 
 
(2.29) (3.47) (2.24) (3.40) 
Tobin's Q 0.016*** -0.049*** 0.012*** -0.034*** 
 
(5.36) (-4.00) (4.53) (-3.51) 
Altman Z-score -0.053*** -0.102*** -0.038*** -0.105*** 
 
(-26.89) (-12.27) (-18.98) (-7.12) 
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Kaplan-Zingales index -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.007*** 
 
(-6.39) (-4.76) (-4.79) (-3.07) 
Supplier variables 
    
Size 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.015*** 
  
(5.74) 
 
(4.99) 
Leverage 
 
-0.082** 
 
-0.043 
  
(-2.15) 
 
(-1.43) 
Asset tangibility 
 
0.077* 
 
0.074** 
  
(1.73) 
 
(2.35) 
Cash holding 
 
0.032 
 
0.036 
  
(1.11) 
 
(1.29) 
Market share 
 
0.003 
 
0.045 
  
(0.07) 
 
(1.09) 
Sales growth 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
  
(-3.44) 
 
(-3.71) 
Profit margin 
 
0.004 
 
0.002 
  
(1.05) 
 
(0.59) 
Tobin's Q 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.008* 
  
(-0.60) 
 
(-1.86) 
Altman Z-score 
 
-0.005 
 
0.000 
  
(-1.70) 
 
(0.11) 
Kaplan-Zingales index 
 
-0.000* 
 
-0.000 
  
(-1.75) 
 
(-0.09) 
Customers’ industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Suppliers’ industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.198*** 0.490*** 0.163*** 0.191 
 
(11.67) (3.32) (3.58) (1.23) 
Observations 41121 8825 41121 8825 
Adjusted R-squared 0.051 0.236 0.191 0.338 
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Table 2.6: Customers’ social performance and trade credit: instrumental variable regression 
 
  This table presents the estimated results from instrumental variable regression (or two-stage least square 
regression). Panel A shows the coefficient estimates on the second stage regression. The dependent variable is 
customers’ trade credit (AP/Purchase), the variable of interest is customers’ instrumented CSR. Panel B 
shows the estimated results for the first stage regression, where we regress customers’ CSR on the 
instrumental variables and control variables. The instrumental variables for customers’ CSR include firms’ 
external political environment and industry median CSR in the 4-digit SIC code. A firm’s external political 
environment is defined as the proportion of votes received by the Democratic candidate for president in 
election 2012 (i.e., Barack Obama) in the state where the firm is headquartered, following Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014). The industry median CSR is calculated based on the whole KLD sample. Column 1 is 
based on the whole KLD sample, customers’ industry fixed effects and quarter fixed effects are included. 
Column 2 is based on the customer-supplier pairs sample, so suppliers’ industry fixed effects are further 
added. The sample runs from 2004 through 2010. Standard errors are clustered at quarter level, and t-statistics 
are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Instrumental variable regression 
 
Whole KLD sample Customer-supplier  
pairs sample 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Customers’ CSR (Instrumented) 0.268*** 0.214*** 
 
(13.51) (3.45) 
Customer variables 
  
Size 0.019*** 0.013 
 
(3.31) (0.63) 
Leverage -0.027 -0.076 
 
(-1.45) (-0.43) 
Asset tangibility 0.141*** 0.862*** 
 
(5.67) (5.57) 
Cash holding 0.075** 0.634** 
 
(2.05) (2.39) 
Market share -0.312*** -1.009*** 
 
(-10.60) (-13.28) 
Sales growth -0.003 -0.071 
 
(-0.22) (-0.94) 
Profit margin 0.004 0.068 
 
(1.23) (1.24) 
Tobin's Q 0.010*** -0.014 
 
(3.58) (-0.83) 
Altman Z-score -0.049*** -0.107*** 
 
(-17.34) (-7.63) 
Kaplan-Zingales index -0.001*** -0.007*** 
 
(-4.59) (-2.86) 
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Supplier variables 
  
Size 
 
0.020*** 
  
(7.42) 
Leverage 
 
-0.088*** 
  
(-2.91) 
Asset tangibility 
 
0.089*** 
  
(2.81) 
Cash holding 
 
0.085** 
  
(2.32) 
Market share 
 
0.047 
  
(1.07) 
Sales growth 
 
-0.023*** 
  
(-4.87) 
Profit margin 
 
-0.003 
  
(-1.00) 
Tobin's Q 
 
-0.007 
  
(-1.52) 
Altman Z-score 
 
-0.007*** 
  
(-3.60) 
Kaplan-Zingales index 
 
0.000 
  
(0.57) 
Customers’ industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Suppliers’ industry fixed effects No Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes 
Constant 0.119** 0.109 
 
(2.24) (0.70) 
Observations 32162 8024 
Adjusted R-squared 0.195 0.361 
Weak identification test (F-statistics) 304.566 190.068 
Hansen' J statistics (p-value) 0.490  0.116 
Panel B: First stage regression 
 
Whole KLD sample Customer-supplier  
pairs sample 
Instrument variables (1) (2) 
Political environment 0.077*** 2.112*** 
 
(3.07) (18.59) 
Industry median CSR 0.720*** 0.972*** 
 
(81.99) (38.97) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.481 0.743 
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Table 2.7: Customers’ social performance and trade credit: propensity score matching 
 
  This table presents the estimated results based on propensity score matching. Panel A is based on the whole 
KLD sample, while panel B is based on the customer-supplier pairs sample. The outcome variable is 
customers’ trade credit (AP/Purchase). The treatment variable is customers’ social performance, which is 
proxied by the CSR score in the KLD database. To facilitate matching, we partition the sample into two 
sub-samples based on the median CSR score.  
 
  Trade credit Difference Z-statistics (P-value) 
Panel A: Results for the whole KLD sample 
High CSR 0.597  
0.035  1.93 (0.054) 
Low CSR 0.562  
    Panel B: Results for the customer-suppler pairs sample  
High CSR 0.755  
0.105   3.92 (0.023) 
Low CSR 0.649  
 
 
79 
 
Table 2.8: Customers’ social performance and trade credit during the global financial crisis 
 
  This table presents the estimated results from regressing customers’ trade credit on social performance 
during the global financial crisis. We estimate the regression based on the difference-in-difference (DID) 
approach. The sample ranges from 2005Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is customers’ trade credit 
(AP/Purchase). The variable of interest is the interaction of customers’ social performance and crisis indicator. 
The crisis indicator equals one for the quarters between 2007Q3 and 2008Q2, and zero otherwise. Customers’ 
social performance is proxied by the CSR score in the KLD database, and it is measured at the end of year 
2005. Panel A shows the estimated results for the whole KLD sample (column 1-2) and the customer-supplier 
pairs sample (column 3-4). In panel B and panel C, we further partition the whole KLD sample into less 
financially constrained firms and more financial constrained firms based on the median financial constraint. 
Panel B shows the estimated results for the less financially constrained firms, and panel C shows the results 
for more financially constrained firms. Because there are not enough balanced panel observations for the 
difference-in-difference (DID) analysis in the customer-supplier pairs sample, we do not further partition the 
pairs sample into sub-samples. We use four proxies for financial constraint, they are Kaplan-Zingales index 
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), Whited-Wu index (Whited and Wu, 2006), Size-Age index (Hadlock and Pierce, 
2010), and bank line of credit (Sufi, 2009). The Kaplan-Zingales index, Whited-Wu index, and Size-Age 
index are measured at the end of year 2005. Bank line of credit is calculated based on the observations 
between 1996 and 2003, and the dataset is collected by Sufi (2009). All specifications for the whole KLD 
sample include firm fixed effects, and the specifications for the customer-supplier pairs sample include 
customer-supplier pair fixed effects. Z-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Customers’ social performance and trade credit during the global financial crisis 
 
Whole KLD sample Customer-supplier pairs sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crisis 0.009 -0.004 0.023** 0.012 
 
(1.36) (-0.58) (2.28) (0.45) 
Crisis × Customers’ CSR -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.136*** -0.165*** 
 
(-3.20) (-3.14) (-6.97) (-3.79) 
Customer variables No Yes No Yes 
Supplier variables No No No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Customer-supplier pair  
fixed effects 
No No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.581*** 0.317*** 0.754*** -2.374 
 
(194.75) (2.80) (277.78) (-1.40) 
Observations 17865 17315 1980 1731 
Adjusted R-squared 0.787 0.796 0.882 0.889 
Panel B: Results for the less financially constrained firms in the whole KLD sample 
 
Kaplan-Zingales Whited-Wu Size-Age Line of Credit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crisis -0.018** -0.005 -0.018** -0.009 
 
(-2.02) (-0.51) (-2.01) (-1.01) 
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Crisis × Customers’ CSR -0.032* -0.065*** -0.055*** -0.049** 
 
(-1.66) (-3.72) (-3.12) (-2.50) 
Customer variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.245* -0.065 -0.784*** -0.259 
 
(1.72) (-0.33) (-4.02) (-1.55) 
Observations 8167 8588 8679 10508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.741 0.796 0.808 0.810 
Panel C: Results for the more financially constrained firms in the whole KLD sample 
 
Kaplan-Zingales Whited-Wu Size-Age Line of Credit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crisis 0.024** -0.007 0.004 -0.011 
 
(2.22) (-0.68) (0.36) (-0.67) 
Crisis × Customers’ CSR -0.040 -0.012 -0.031 -0.060 
 
(-1.09) (-0.21) (-0.61) (-1.26) 
Customer variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.838*** 0.486*** 0.795*** 0.895*** 
 
(4.68) (3.59) (5.84) (3.95) 
Observations 8055 8631 8585 3729 
Adjusted R-squared 0.832 0.796 0.789 0.762 
 81 
Table 2.9: Results for different CSR dimensions and industries 
 
This table presents the estimated results from regressing customers’ trade credit on social performance for 
different CSR dimensions and industries. All specifications are based on the whole KLD sample, which ranges 
from 2004 to 2010. The dependent variable is customers’ trade credit (AP/Purchase). Customers’ social 
performance is proxied by the CSR score in the KLD database. Panel A shows the results for each CSR 
dimension. We introduce six dimensions of CSR, including community, diversity, employee relations, 
environmental protection, human rights, and product quality. Panel B shows the results for different industries. 
Based on the Fama-French five industries classification, we partition the sample into five sub-samples, 
corresponding to consumer goods (Cnsmr), manufacturing (Manuf), high technology (HiTec), healthcare (Hlth), 
and other. Standard errors are clustered at quarter level, and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CSR dimensions 
 
CSR dimensions 
 
Community Diversity Employee Environment Human rights Product 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR 0.585*** 0.320*** 0.041 0.273*** 0.585*** 0.200*** 
 
(15.32) (14.85) (1.57) (15.37) (5.94) (5.39) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 41121 41121 41121 41121 41121 41121 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.190 0.190 0.188 0.189 0.188 0.188 
Panel B: Different industries 
 
Fama-French five industries 
 
Consumer 
goods 
Manufacturing High technology Healthcare Other 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CSR 0.065*** 0.124*** 0.190*** 0.338*** -0.131*** 
 
(3.63) (5.34) (11.06) (10.19) (-6.87) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 8822 11333 10661 5407 4898 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.185 0.339 0.047 0.079 0.163 
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3. Heterogeneous Credit Crunch Shock and the Effectiveness of Corporate 
Governance 
3.1 Introduction 
The effectiveness of corporate governance has attracted lots of attention from both 
academics and practitioners, especially after the recent global financial crisis. Considering the 
endogeneity property of corporate governance mechanisms (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; 
Wintoki et al., 2012), prior literature analyzes the effectiveness of corporate governance 
based on external shocks, such as economic crises. The empirical findings are mixed in this 
issue. Although some studies confirm the effectiveness of corporate governance (e.g., Mitton, 
2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Baek et al., 2004; Bae et al., 2012), Beltratti and Stulz (2012) 
and Erkens (2012) find different results. 
We explore this topic by examining how the heterogeneous adverse shock during the 
crisis influences the effectiveness of corporate governance. Following Johnson et al. (2000a) 
and Bae et al. (2012), we theoretically illustrate the role of corporate governance in deterring 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation. The logic of the theoretical model is as follows: The 
adverse shock stimulates controlling shareholders’ incentive to expropriate minority 
shareholders, thus the shareholder-protecting corporate governance mechanisms play a role in 
deterring expropriation and improving firm performances. We further show that in a firm 
being exposed to severer adverse shock, the controlling shareholder expropriates more, and 
the effectiveness of corporate governance becomes more significant. 
We test the above hypotheses using the non-financial publicly listed firms in China 
during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. We use the Chinese sample for several reasons: 
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First, China has low level of investor protection, and corporate governance mechanisms are 
important in protecting the interests of small investors (Berkman et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 
2010). Second, most firms in China show concentrated ownership, the main principal-agency 
problem is the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010), which is consistent with our 
theoretical model setting. 35
                                                             
35 In developed economics, legal protection for investors is relatively better. The main principal-agency problem is the 
conflict between dispersed owners and professional managers, as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, in 
emerging economics, firms’ ownership is concentrated, and the main principal-agency problem is the conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). 
 Third, as the largest emerging market China experienced 
significantly adverse shock during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (Liu, 2009; Liang, 
2010; Overholt, 2010). Since the crisis stems from the United States, and it is an external 
shock to Chinese economy, endogeneity concerns of using this shock are mitigated.  
One feature of the recent global financial crisis is debt market freeze and credit crunch 
(Ryan, 2008; Tong and Wei, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009; Iyer et al., 2013), which makes firms 
lose many valuable investment opportunities (Campello et al., 2010; Cingano et al., 2016). 
Chinese firms were exposed to significant credit crunch shock during the recent financial 
crisis. The loan growth rate in China showed apparent shock between May 2008 and 
February 2009. The long-term loan growth rate was 23% in May 2008, and it decreased to 17% 
in November 2008. The short-term loan growth rate decreased from 14% to 7%. Since 
Chinese firms rely more on bank loans than equity market for financing (Allen et al., 2012), 
the influence of credit crunch shock in China in even aggregated. We find that firms 
depending more on external finance are more fragile for the credit crunch shock, which 
indicates that Chinese firms were heterogeneously exposed to the credit crunch shock. 
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We first investigate the effectiveness of corporate governance during the financial crisis. 
The corporate governance mechanisms we examine include block shareholding, board 
independence, and whether the firm is audited by the big four accounting companies. We also 
include controlling shareholders' excess voting rights, which are viewed as the motivating 
factor for controlling shareholders’ expropriation (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Claessens et al., 2002). We find that, controlling shareholders' excess voting rights are 
negatively associated with firm performance during the crisis, but the above relation does not 
hold either before or after the crisis. Surprisingly, shareholder-protecting corporate 
governance mechanisms are not significantly associated with firm performance during the 
crisis.  
To resolve the above doubt, we further investigate the moderating role of heterogeneous 
credit crunch shock on the effectiveness of corporate governance. We construct the 
interaction between heterogeneous credit crunch shock and corporate governance mechanism. 
Since firms depending more on external finance are more fragile for the credit crunch shock, 
we use firms’ external finance dependence as the proxy for heterogeneous credit crunch 
shock. The higher external finance dependence represents severer credit crunch shock. We 
find that, when a firm depends more on external finance, corporate governance mechanisms 
are more effective in deterring expropriation and improving firm performance.  
The above finding implies that the effectiveness of corporate governance depends on the 
severity of credit crunch shock. Corporate governance becomes more effective in deterring 
expropriation when a firm is exposed to severer credit crunch shock. Since some Chinese 
firms were not severely influenced by the credit crunch shock, the effectiveness of corporate 
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governance could not be significant in these firms, even during the crisis. Therefore, it can 
explain why we do not observe significant results in the initial level regression.  
Furthermore, the above finding is more pronounced when controlling shareholders hold 
higher cash flow rights. Since the controlling shareholders with higher cash flow rights are 
more sensitive to the adverse shock, they have higher expropriation incentives, and hence 
corporate governance is more likely to play a role in these firms. It further supports the 
moderating role of heterogeneous credit crunch shock. In sum, the above results imply that, 
corporate governance deters expropriation only if a firm is exposed to severe adverse shock.  
Our study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Prior studies (e.g., Mitton, 2002; Bae et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 
2012) do not reach an agreement on the role of corporate governance in protecting 
shareholder interests. This paper shows that heterogeneous adverse shock could be an 
important moderating factor. With a firm being exposed to severer adverse shock, corporate 
governance mechanisms become more effective in deterring expropriation and improving 
firm performance. In this sense, it provides a possible explanation for the mixed findings in 
the prior literature. 
Second, this paper deepens our understanding on the credit crunch shock during the 
recent global financial crisis. Previous studies document the impact of credit crunch on 
corporate financing and investment decision (e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009; Campello et al., 2010; 
Duchin et al., 2010; Cingano et al., 2016). However, few studies try to investigate its 
influence on corporate governance issues. In this paper, we analyze how the credit crunch 
shock affects controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives and corporate governance 
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effectiveness. Our results show that the credit crunch shock that took place during the global 
financial crisis has significant influence on the principal-agency conflict inside the 
companies. 
Third, most previous studies on global financial crisis focus on the U.S. market (e.g., 
Tong and Wei, 2008; Duchin et al., 2010) or the European countries (Iyer et al., 2013; 
Cingano et al., 2016). Chinese economy also suffered from apparent shock during the global 
financial crisis, but few studies investigate the situation of Chinese firms during the crisis. 
This paper complements previous studies by analyzing the impact of global financial crisis on 
Chinese economy, and its influence on corporate governance issues. Furthermore, the global 
financial crisis can be viewed as an external shock to Chinese economy, thus it reduces the 
endogeneity concern. 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we theoretically illustrate 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives during an adverse external shock. We 
further show how the heterogeneous adverse shock moderates the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. Section 3 describes the dataset and research design. Section 4 reports the 
empirical results. We conclude in section 5. 
3.2 Theoretical model 
In countries with poor investor protection, firms are typically controlled by controlling 
shareholders via pyramid ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). 
Following Johnson et al. (2000a), La Porta et al. (2002), and Bae et al. (2012), we 
theoretically analyze the corporate governance problem based on the conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Inspired by Claessens et al. (2000) and 
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Claessens et al. (2002), we introduce the separation of controlling shareholders’ voting rights 
and cash flow rights as the motivating factor for expropriation. We also extend prior 
theoretical works by exploring the moderating role of heterogeneous adverse shock on 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation and the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
3.2.1 Model setting 
A controlling shareholder’s expropriation is driven by its utility maximization process. 
Following Johnson et al. (2000a), La Porta et al. (2002), and Bae et al. (2012), we assume the 
controlling shareholder's utility comes from two sources: expropriation benefit and 
investment return from the company. If the controlling shareholder expropriates more 
resources from the company, less capital is left in the company for future investment. To 
maximize its utility, the controlling shareholder needs to choose the optimal level of 
expropriation. 
Following Bae et al. (2012), we define initω as the initial capital stock, andω  as the 
feasible capital stock. Accordingly, initδ ω ω= −  is the resource that the controlling 
shareholder steals from the company (i.e., expropriation). Previous studies document the 
wide existence of expropriation, especially in emerging markets (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000b; 
Young et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010), so here we assume the controlling shareholder’s 
expropriationδ is greater than zero. 
Expropriation is usually accompanied with cost. Following Johnson et al. (2000a) and 
La Porta et al. (2002), we describe the expropriation cost as a quadratic function of 
expropriation, that is 
2 2( )
2 2
initδ ω ω
κ λρ κ λρ
−
=
⋅ ⋅
.                                                   (1) 
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With expropriation being severer, the expropriation cost increases more quickly. Hereκ
denotes the corporate governance mechanisms. A smaller κ represents better corporate 
governance mechanisms, and it increases the expropriation cost. 
Expropriation cost is also determined by the controlling shareholder’s voting rights. 
When a controlling shareholder has higher voting rights, it can expropriate resources with 
lower cost. We use ρ to represent the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights, andλ to 
represent the disparity between voting rights and cash flow rights (i.e., control-ownership 
disparity). Accordingly, λρ represents controlling shareholders’ voting rights. Controlling 
shareholders usually control the listed firms via pyramid ownership structure (Claessens et al., 
2000, 2002), and the voting rights are equal or greater than the cash flow rights, thus we 
assume 1λ ≥ . 
Previous studies attribute controlling shareholders’ expropriation to the disparity 
between voting right and cash flow rights (i.e., control-ownership disparity) (Claessens et al., 
2000, 2002). Through controlling shareholders’ voting rightsλρ , we directly introduce the 
control-ownership disparity into the theoretical model. To our best knowledge, this is the first 
paper that theoretically incorporates the control-ownership disparity. It provides new insights 
into the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders. 
The controlling shareholder’s utility also comes from the investment return of the 
company. We specify the production function as Iπ , where I represents the investment, and 
π represents the payoff rate. We assume the investment project is profitable, that is 1π > . 
Firms are difficult to raise new capital during the credit crunch, so it is reasonable to restrict 
the investment I to the feasible capital stock ω , that is I ω≤ . Since the controlling 
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shareholder’s cash flow rights are ρ , the end-of-period equity value that belongs to the 
controlling shareholder is [ ( )]I Iρ ω π+ − . 
To simplify analysis, we assume the controlling shareholder is risk neutral. The 
controlling shareholder’s utility maximization problem can be described as 
2
,
( )
[ ( )] ( ) ,
2
init
I initMax I Iω
ω ωρ ω π ω ω
κ λρ
  −
+ − + − −  ⋅  
                          (2) 
subject to  and .init Iω ω ω≤ ≤  
The controlling shareholder needs to choose the optimal feasible capital stock *ω and the 
optimal investment *I to maximize its utility. Since the initial capital stock initω is given at the 
beginning of the period, choosing the optimal feasible capital stock *ω is equivalent to 
choosing the optimal expropriation *δ (i.e., *initω ω− ).  
3.2.2 Model solution 
We solve the controlling shareholder’s utility maximization problem through two steps. 
We first obtain the optimal investment *I for a given level of expropriation. After 
incorporating the optimal investment *I , we further obtain the controlling shareholder’s 
optimal expropriation *δ . 
For a given level of expropriation, the controlling shareholder can maximize the 
end-of-period equity value by solving 
{ }[ ( )] ,IMax I Iρ ω π+ −                                                    (3) 
Subject to .I ω≤  
Solving the above equation, we obtain the optimal investment *I ω= . It implies that the 
controlling shareholder invests all the feasible capital to maximize the firm’s end-of-period 
equity value. 
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After incorporating the optimal investment *I , the controlling shareholder’s utility 
maximization problem can be simplified as follows 
2( )
( ) ,
2
init
initMaxω
ω ωρπω ω ω
κ λρ
  −
+ − −  ⋅  
                                    (4) 
subject to .initω ω≤  
Solving the above maximization problem, we obtain the optimal feasible capital stock 
* ( 1) .initω ω ρπ κ λρ= + − ⋅                                                    (5) 
Accordingly, we can obtain the controlling shareholder’s optimal expropriation 
* * ( 1) .initδ ω ω ρπ κ λρ= − = − − ⋅                                                 (6) 
Investment returnπ is relatively smaller during the crisis, so we follow Bae et al. (2012) to 
assumeπ is less than 1
ρ
, then 1 0ρπ − < .36
*ω
 This assumption ensures that we can obtain the 
inner solution to the above maximization problem. 
It is worth to note that, the controlling shareholder’s expropriation ultimately reflects on 
the stock return. Given the optimal feasible capital stock , the firm’s end-of-period equity 
value is * *initπω πω πδ= − . The stock return within the period can be described as the function 
of optimal expropriation *δ , that is 
* *
1 .init
init init
r
πω ω πδπ
ω ω
−
= = − −                                                     (7) 
With the controlling shareholder conducting more expropriation, less resource will be left for 
future investment, and the firm will have lower stock return. Therefore, we can detect the 
controlling shareholder’s expropriation by comparing stock return. 
                                                             
36 We also verify this assumption using the real dataset. The global financial crisis had severe impact on Chinese economy, 
and the average Return on Assets (ROA) of Chinese non-financial firms is only 0.0254 in 2008, that is π =1.0254. All our 
sample firms could meet the requirement of 1 0ρπ − < . 
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3.2.3 Comparative statics analysis 
In this section, we examine the effectiveness of corporate governance through 
comparative statics analysis. Because expropriation ultimately reflects on stock return, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance on deterring expropriation can be detected by 
analyzing the influence of corporate governance on stock return. Since the investment return
π represents the extent of external shock (Liu et al., 2009), we further investigate the 
moderating role of heterogeneous adverse shock. The impact of the controlling shareholder’s 
cash flow rights is also discussed. 
To analyze the influence of corporate governance on stock return, we take the first order 
derivative of stock return r with respect to the control-ownership disparityλ and corporate 
governanceκ , respectively. That is 
* ( 1)
,
init init
r π δ π ρπ κρ
λ ω λ ω
 ∂ ∂ −
= ⋅ − = ∂ ∂ 
                                             (8) 
* ( 1)
.
init init
r π δ π ρπ λρ
κ ω κ ω
 ∂ ∂ −
= ⋅ − = ∂ ∂ 
                                             (9) 
The direction of the above derivative equations is ultimately determined by the derivative of 
expropriation (i.e., * /δ λ∂ ∂ and * /δ κ∂ ∂ ). When better corporate governance mechanism κ
deters expropriation (i.e., * / 0δ κ∂ ∂ > ), it increases stock return (i.e., / 0r κ∂ ∂ < ). Similarly, 
when the control-ownership disparity λ stimulates expropriation (i.e., * / 0δ λ∂ ∂ > ), it 
decreases stock return (i.e., / 0r λ∂ ∂ < ). Therefore, we can investigate the effectiveness of 
corporate governance based on stock return. 
The direction of equation (8) and (9) is determined by 1ρπ − . Considering the 
assumption 1 /π ρ< during the adverse shock, we have 1 0ρπ − < , thus both of equation (8) 
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and (9) are negative. It implies that the control-ownership disparityλ is negatively associated 
with stock return during the adverse shock. In contrast, shareholder protecting corporate 
governance mechanismκ is positively associated with stock return.  
However, the above predictions do not necessarily hold during boom or normal state. 
When the economic situation is good, the investment returnπ tends to be high, and the 
condition 1 /π ρ< does not necessarily hold. In this situation, the controlling shareholder has 
less expropriation incentive, and it would choose to leave the resource inside the company to 
increase its equity value. Therefore, the control-ownership disparity and corporate 
governance are not expected to show significant influence on stock return during boom or 
normal state. 
The recent global financial crisis caused severe adverse shock to Chinese economy. 
Summarizing the above discussions, we propose the following testable hypothesis: 
H1. During the global financial crisis, the control-ownership disparity is negatively 
associated with stock return, and the shareholder protecting corporate governance is 
positively associated with stock return. However, the above relation does not hold before or 
after the crisis. 
As discussed above, the adverse shock plays a key role in stimulating expropriation and 
initiating the effectiveness of corporate governance. During an adverse macro shock, different 
firms could be exposed to different level of shock. In the following section, we further 
investigate how the effectiveness of corporate governance is moderated by the heterogeneous 
external shock. Since the investment returnπ reflects the extent of external shock, we 
investigate the moderating role of heterogeneous adverse shock by taking the second order 
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partial derivative of equation (8) and (9) with respect to the investment returnπ , that is 
2 * 2 *1
,
init init
r δ π δ
λ π ω λ ω λ π
∂ ∂ ∂
= − ⋅ − ⋅
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
                                              (10) 
2 * 2 *1
.
init init
r δ π δ
κ π ω κ ω κ π
∂ ∂ ∂
= − ⋅ − ⋅
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
                                              (11) 
The above derivative equations can be described as the function of the controlling 
shareholder’s expropriation *δ . Specially, equation (10) consists of two components: the first 
order derivative 1 *( / )initω δ λ
−− ⋅ ∂ ∂ and the second order derivative 2 *( / ) ( / )initπ ω δ λ π− ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂ . 
Since * / 0δ λ∂ ∂ > , the first order derivative factor 1 *( / )initω δ λ
−− ⋅ ∂ ∂ is negative. The second 
order derivative factor 2 *( / ) ( / )initπ ω δ λ π− ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂ can be written as
2( / )initπ ω κρ⋅ , which is 
positive. Thus, the direction of equation (10) is determined by the relative magnitude of the 
first order derivative factor and the second order derivative factor. Similarly, the direction of 
equation (11) is also determined by the first order derivative factor and second order 
derivative factor of expropriation *δ . 
The controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights ρ have significant influence on the 
direction of equation (10) and (11). When a controlling shareholder has higher cash flow 
rights, its end-of-period equity value *ρπω is more sensitive to the external shock. Therefore, 
it has a higher incentive to expropriate resource from the company. Accordingly, the second 
order derivatives of expropriation, 2 * /δ λ π∂ ∂ ∂ and 2 * /δ κ π∂ ∂ ∂ , take lower values, and the 
equation (10) and (11) are more likely to be positive.37
The positive equation (10) and (11) imply that, the effectiveness of corporate 
 
                                                             
37 The second order derivative
2 *
/δ λ π∂ ∂ ∂ can be derived as 2κρ− , which is monotonically decreasing with respect to the 
controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights ρ . With the cash flow rights ρ increasing, the value of
2 *
/δ λ π∂ ∂ ∂ decreases, and 
the second order derivative factor 2 *( / ) ( / )initπ ω δ λ π− ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂ increases. Accordingly, equation (10) is more likely to be positive. 
Similarly, equation (11) is also more likely to be positive when the cash flow rights ρ increase. 
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governance enhances with the severity of adverse shock. When a firm is exposed to severer 
adverse shock, its controlling shareholder has a higher incentive to expropriate resource, and 
the shareholder protecting corporate governance mechanism is more likely to play a role in 
deterring expropriation. Since expropriation ultimately reflects on stock return, with a firm 
being exposed to severer adverse shock, the control-ownership disparity is more likely to be 
negatively associated with stock return, and corporate governance is more effective in 
improving firm performance. 
To more clearly demonstrate the role of cash flow rights, we further derive equation (10) 
and (11) as follows: 
2 (2 1)
,
init
r ρπ κρ
λ π ω
∂ −
=
∂ ∂
                                                        (12) 
2 (2 1)
.
init
r ρπ λρ
κ π ω
∂ −
=
∂ ∂
                                                         (13) 
Suppose a controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights ρ are greater than or equal to 50%, we 
have 2 1ρ ≥ (or1 / 2 1ρ ≤ ). Given that the investment project is profitable (i.e., 1π > ), we can 
obtain 1 1 / 2π ρ> ≥ , and hence 2 1 0ρπ − > and the equation (12) and (13) are positive. It is 
worth to note that, although in the above analyses we set the cash flow rights of 50% as the 
threshold, the exact threshold point could vary with model settings. In general, with the 
controlling shareholder having higher cash flow rights, the adverse shock is more likely to 
stimulate the effectiveness of corporate governance. Accordingly, the impact of 
heterogeneous adverse shock on the effectiveness of corporate governance is more 
pronounced.  
During the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, different firms are heterogeneously 
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exposed to the credit crunch shock. Summarizing the above discussions, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H2. With a firm being exposed to severer credit crunch shock, the control-ownership 
disparity is more negatively associated with stock return, and the shareholder protecting 
corporate governance is more effective in improving stock return. Furthermore, the above 
relation is more pronounced when a controlling shareholder has higher cash flow rights. 
3.3 Sample and research design 
3.3.1 Data 
We test the hypotheses using the Chinese non-financial public firms during the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis. We use the Chinese sample for two main reasons: First, our 
theoretical model is based on the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, which is typical in developing countries (Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 
2002; Young, 2008; Jiang et al., 2010). 38
As the biggest developing country, China lacks legal protection for small investors, and 
most firms show concentrated ownership. Following La Parta et al. (1999), we calculate the 
ownership concentration of the biggest ten Chinese non-financial public firms in 2007. The 
average total shareholdings of the top three shareholders are as high as 74%, which is even 
greater than the biggest shareholdings shown in La Porta et al. (1999) (which is 67% in Greek 
 In developed countries, the main corporate 
governance issue is the conflict between dispersed shareholders and management team.  
                                                             
38 Claessens et al. (2000) and Claessens et al. (2002) use the sample from Asian developing countries to examine the 
disparity between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights. Previous studies on corporate governance 
effectiveness (e.g., Mitton, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Baek et al., 2004; Bae et al., 2012) also use the sample from 
developing countries. 
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firms).39
As demonstrated in Figure 3.2, Chinese economy experienced apparent shock between 
May 2008 and February 2009. Several macroeconomic indicators including industrial 
production growth rate, export growth rate, and consumer confidence index showed apparent 
decrease since May 2008. In Figure 3.1, the short-term and long-term loan growth rate also 
significantly decreased since May 2008. Considering the stable growth of Chinese economy 
 Thus, the concentrated ownership and the conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders in China are in line with our theoretical model setting. 
Second, the credit crunch shock that took place during the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis showed significant impact on Chinese economy. Furthermore, since the global financial 
crisis stems from the U.S., it can be viewed as an external shock to Chinese economy. One 
feature of the recent global financial crisis is credit crunch (Ryan, 2008; Tong and Wei, 2008; 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Iyer et al., 2013). Due to financial institutions’ risk transfer and network 
effect, the credit crunch shock diffused around the world (Brunnermeier, 2009; Iyer et al., 
2013; Cingano et al., 2016). Campello et al. (2010) find that the credit crunch during the 
recent financial crisis has stronger impact on Asia and Europe than the U.S.. It could be 
because the Asian and European firms depends more on bank loans than the U.S. firms 
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008). China financial system is denominated by the banking sector, 
whereas the bond market and equity market are limited and ineffective (Allen et al., 2012). 
Therefore, Chinese economy is more likely to be negatively impacted during the global 
financial crisis.  
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
                                                             
39 We also calculate the ownership concentration in all the Chinese non-financial public firms. The average shareholdings of 
the top three shareholders are 49%. 
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before 2008, the sudden collapse between May 2008 and February 2009 can be attributed to 
the external shock caused by the global financial crisis.  
Several previous studies based on the U.S. market (e.g., Ryan, 2008; Erkens et al., 2012) 
set early 2007 as the starting point of the financial crisis. Since we are mainly interested in 
the period when the crisis had real effect on Chinese economy, and it takes time for the 
financial crisis to diffuse into other developing countries, it is reasonable to set May 2008 as 
the starting point of crisis in China. 
[Insert Figure 3.2 about here] 
We also check the impact of the global financial crisis on Chinese economy based on the 
stock market, following Tong and Wei (2008). Figure 3.3 reports the China Shanghai & 
Shenzhen 300 Stock Index (HS300), and three other stock market indices from the U.S., U.K., 
and Japan. To facilitate illustration, we standardize the indices value in May 2008 to 100. As 
shown in Figure 3.3, the four indices show high integration between 2007 and 2009. In May 
2008, all the three indices from the U.S., U.K., and Japan began to decrease significantly. 
Although HS300 also experienced decrease before May 2008, it could be due to the burst of 
bubble, because China stock market experienced a great bull market between May 2007 and 
October 2007. So we define the period between May 2008 and February 2009 as the crisis 
period in China. 
 [Insert Figure 3.3 about here] 
It is worth to note that, China government announced a dramatic economic stimulus 
package in November 2008 (Liang, 2010; Overholt, 2010). One important plan is to invest 
four trillion RMB (about 586 billion U.S. dollars) in infrastructure and social welfare by the 
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end of 2010. Meanwhile, the monetary policy shifted from “tight” to “moderately loose”. 
Banks’ reserve requirement and benchmark interest rates were reduced several times around 
the end of 2008.40
3.3.2 Sample selection 
 As a response, bank loans (as shown in Figure 3.1) and the stock market 
(as shown in Figure 3.3) began to increase around November 2008. Considering the 
intervention of the economic stimulus plan, we set November 2008 as the alternative ending 
point of crisis period in China. 
The sample consists of the non-financial firms that publicly listed in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange at the end of December 2007. The data is from the 
RESSET Financial Research Database, which is one of the biggest databases in China.41 
Since our theoretical model is based on the conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders, we need to ensure a controlling shareholder has enough control on the 
listed firm. Following La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Claessens et al. 
(2002), we exclude the firms where the controlling shareholders’ voting rights are less than 
10%.42 We also exclude the firms that report abnormal transactions during the crisis period. 
These abnormal transactions include Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT). We 
further exclude the firms that change their industry code between 2007 and 2010.43
3.3.3 Research specification 
 The final 
sample includes 625 firms’ observations. 
Hypothesis H1 predicts that corporate governance is positively associated with crisis 
                                                             
40 The U.S. and U.K. government also announced similar policies around the same time (Erkens et al., 2012).  
41 For more information about the RESSET Financial Research Database, please see http://www2.resset.cn/en/. 
42 Among the 694 firms, controlling shareholders have the voting rights of less than 10% in 42 firms. 
43 Here a firm is viewed as changing its industry code if its 3-digit industry code changes. 
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period stock return. As we discussed in the theoretical section, controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation ultimately reflects on stock return. Using stock return as the dependent variable, 
we actually test the effectiveness of corporate governance in deterring expropriation. The 
external shock during the financial crisis provides a quasi-experiment, through which we can 
examine whether the ex ante corporate governance mechanisms prior to crisis explain the ex 
post magnitude of stock price decline during the crisis. This method is also used in prior 
studies such as Mitton (2002), Baek et al. (2004), and Bae et al. (2012).  
The regression specification is as follows: 
, , 1 , 1 , ,i t i t i t in d i tR B CG Z Xα α ε− −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + +                                   (14) 
where ,i tR denotes the stock return during the financial crisis. The crisis period we define 
ranges from May 1st, 2008 to February 28th, 2009, which covers 197 trading days. We first 
calculate the daily abnormal return based on long run event study. The Fama-French three 
factors model is employed to adjust the systematic risk (Fama and French, 1993). To facilitate 
interpreting the regression coefficients, we use annualized abnormal return as the dependent 
variable.  
The independent variables are based on the observations at the end of fiscal year 2007.
, 1i tCG − denotes the control-ownership disparity and corporate governance prior to the crisis. 
, 1i tX − represents the control variables, which include size, market to book ratio, leverage, and 
the proportion of intangible assets. indα denotes the industry fixed effects, which is based on 
the 2-digit industry classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). To 
adjust for possible dependence in the residuals for the firms from the same industry, we use 
clustered standard errors at industry level following Froot (1989) and Kothari and Warner 
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(1997). Appendix A shows the detailed description of all variables. 
Hypothesis H1 also predicts that corporate governance is not significantly associated 
with stock return before or after the crisis. To be parallel with crisis period, the pre-crisis 
period is defined as between May 2007 and February 2008, and the post-crisis period is 
defined as between May 2009 and February 2010. We calculate the stock return for pre-crisis 
and post-crisis period, respectively. Accordingly, the independent variables for the pre-crisis 
regression are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006, and the independent variables for the 
post-crisis regression are measured at the end of fiscal year 2008. 
Hypothesis H2 predicts that corporate governance is more effective when a firm is 
exposed to severer credit crunch shock. We test this prediction using the following regression 
equation: 
, 1 , 1 2 3 , 1 , 1 , ,i t i t i i t i i t in d i tR B CG B Shock B CG Shock Z Xα α ε− − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + +          (15) 
where iShock measures the extent of credit crunch shock that a firm is exposed to. A greater 
value of iShock represents the severer credit crunch shock during the crisis. Our coefficient of 
interest is 3B , which captures the moderating role of heterogeneous credit crunch shock. A 
positive 3B suggests that the effectiveness of corporate governance increases with the severity 
of credit crunch shock.  
Hypothesis H2 also predicts that the moderating role of heterogeneous credit crunch 
shock is more pronounced when a controlling shareholder has higher cash flow rights. We 
test this prediction by partitioning the total sample into subsamples based on controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights. If H2 holds, we should observe more significant 3B in the 
subsample with higher cash flow rights. We use four different threshold points of cash flow 
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rights to partition the total sample, and they are the cash flow rights of 50%, 45%, 35%, and 
25%, respectively. 
We use a firm’s dependence on external finance to proxy for its exposure to the credit 
crunch shock. The credit crunch shock during the crisis restricts a firm’s investment in the 
attractive projects (Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Cingano et al., 2016).44
We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) to calculate the external finance dependence prior 
to the crisis at industry level. An industry’s dependence on external finance is defined as the 
ratio of external finance to total investment in 2006 and 2007, where external finance is 
calculated as total investment minus internal finance. We collect the data from the China 
Fixed Asset Investment Yearbook (2006, 2007).
 The 
firms that depend more on external finance demonstrate higher level of investment reduction 
during the crisis (Duchin et al., 2010). Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) also find similar pattern 
through examining the impact of banking crises on real activities with the data from 41 
countries between 1980 and 2000. Chinese firms rely more on bank loans rather than bond 
market or equity market (Allen et al., 2012), they are expected to be severely impacted during 
the crisis, and the firms that depend more on external finance should be exposed to severer 
credit crunch shock. 
45
                                                             
44 Campello et al. (2010) conduct a survey on 1050 CFOs around the world. They find that credit constrained firms cut their 
expenditures on technology development and capital accumulation. Duchin et al. (2010) and Cingano et al. (2016) also find 
that corporate investment significantly reduced during the global financial crisis.  
45 Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that external finance dependence reflects each industry’s intrinsic demand for external 
finance, which is determined by the production technology. Since Chinese firms could have different production technology, 
we do not directly use the external finance dependence measure from the U.S. firms. 
 Since the China Fixed Asset Investment 
Yearbook is based on the China National Economic Industry Classification (GB2002), we 
manually match it with the industry classification of China Securities Regulatory 
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Commission (CSRC).46
We test the validity of the proxy for heterogeneous credit crunch shock by examining 
the impact of external finance dependence on firms’ crisis period stock return. Since the 
credit crunch shock constrains firms’ investment on attractive projects, it would ultimately 
reflect on stock return.
 
47
3.3.4 Measurement of corporate governance 
 Tong and Wei (2008) also use similar method to investigate the real 
effect of subprime crisis. We partition the total sample into two subsamples based on firms’ 
external finance dependence. As shown in Panel A of Table 3.1, the average crisis period 
stock return in the high dependence group is negative, and it is significantly lower than that 
of the low dependence group. The above results suggest that external finance dependence is 
negatively related to stock return. 
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
As a further check, we also compare the cumulative excess return of high dependence 
group and low dependence group. As demonstrated in Figure 3.4, the cumulative excess 
return of high dependence group is monotonically decreasing with time, whereas the stock 
return of low dependence group is monotonically increasing. The above findings suggest that 
firms depending more on external finance are exposed to severer credit crunch shock during 
the crisis. Therefore, external finance dependence is a good proxy for the heterogeneous 
credit crunch shock during the crisis. 
[Insert Figure 3.4 about here] 
                                                             
46 To better match these two industry classifications, we use the 2-digit China National Economic Industry Classification 
(GB2002) and the 3-digit industry classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
47 We can also derive the linkage between external shock and stock return based on the theoretical model. Taking the first 
order derivative of stock return r with respect to investment payoff rate π , we have
(2 1)
1
r
init
ρπ κ λρ
π ω
∂ − ⋅
= +∂
. The above 
equation is positive in most cases, and it implies that the severer external shock is related to lower stock return. 
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In this section, we first measure the separation of a controlling shareholder’s voting 
rights and cash flow rights (i.e., control-ownership disparity), then introduce three 
shareholder protecting corporate governance mechanisms that are widely used in China 
Most public firms in China are controlled by controlling shareholders through pyramid 
control chains, which result in the separation of a controlling shareholder’s voting rights and 
cash flow rights. Following Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), and La Porta et al. 
(2002), we define a controlling shareholder’s voting rights as its minimum ownership along 
the control chain. Its cash flow rights measure the shares of payoff that the controlling 
shareholder receives from the listed firm, and it is calculated as the product of the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership along the control chain. Accordingly, the control-ownership 
disparity is measured as the ratio of the controlling shareholder’s voting rights to cash flow 
rights. We manually collect the control chains from each firm’s annual report in fiscal year 
2007. 
Figure 3.5 demonstrates the control chain of a public firm in China. The publicly listed 
firm, the Sichuan New Hope Agricultural Co., Ltd., is ultimately controlled by Mr. Yonghao 
LIU through a two-layer control chain. The voting rights of the controlling shareholder are 
45.26%, and its cash flow rights are 28.04% (i.e., 61.95%× 45.26%). The control-ownership 
disparity is 1.61, which is calculated as 45.26 / 28.04. The controlling shareholder’ voting 
rights and cash flow rights show apparent disparity in this example. 
[Insert Figure 3.5 about here] 
We examine three shareholder protecting corporate governance mechanisms that are 
widely used in China. They are block shareholding, board independence, and big four 
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auditing. First, block shareholding in a listed firm is defined as the shareholding of all the 
block shareholders excluding the controlling shareholder. Following Mitton (2002), Baek et 
al. (2004), and Bae et al. (2012), we classify a shareholder as a block shareholder if it holds at 
least 5% shares.48
To check the exogenous property of credit crunch shock, we compare corporate 
governance under the low / high external finance dependence group. As shown in Panel B of 
 Attig et al. (2008) find that the existence of block shareholders can work 
as an internal governance mechanism to reduce controlling shareholders’ expropriation, and 
the governance role of block shareholders is especially strong in East Asian countries. 
Second, board independence is measured as the proportion of independent directors on 
the board. As documented by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007), independent directors are likely to work on behalf of all the shareholders. Therefore, 
independent directors can counterbalance the power of controlling shareholders on the board. 
We classify a director as an independent director if it is not employed by the company and 
does not have close economic relation with the company or the large shareholders. 
The third corporate governance mechanism we examine is whether a firm is audited by 
the big four accounting companies. Mitton (2002) argues that the big four accounting 
companies can improve a firm’s financial reporting quality, and thus facilitate monitoring the 
controlling shareholder’s expropriation behavior. The big four auditing is defined as an 
indicator variable, which takes the value of one if a firm is audited by the big four accounting 
companies, and zero otherwise. 
                                                             
48 A controlling shareholder holds at least 10% shares of the listed firm in the sample, and hence it is also a block 
shareholder. However, since we aim to measure the governance mechanisms that can deter controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation, we exclude controlling shareholders from block shareholders when measuring the governance variable block 
shareholding. 
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Table 3.1, the control-ownership disparity and corporate governance do not show significant 
difference between the low dependence group and the high dependence group. It suggests 
that the extent to which a firm is exposed to the credit crunch shock is independent of its ex 
ante corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the credit crunch shock during the 
financial crisis can be viewed as an external shock to Chinese firms. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for the sample. Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the 
univariate statistics. The average annualized abnormal return during the crisis period (May 
2008 - February 2009) is 0.02. The median value of abnormal return is 0.01, with the lower 
quartile of -0.28 and the upper quartile of 0.33. Since the abnormal return shows symmetric 
distribution with the median value around zero, it suggests that the listed firms have different 
performance during the crisis. The abnormal return during the alternative crisis period (May 
2008 – November 2008) is higher, with the mean value of 0.05 and the median value of 0.14. 
The firms’ average dependence on external finance is 0.21, with the lower quartile of 0.14 
and the upper quartile of 0.26. It indicates that, on average, external finance accounts for 21% 
of corporate investments prior to the crisis. 
Similar to Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), we observe concentrated ownership and the 
disparity between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights in the sample. 
The average voting rights of controlling shareholders are 38%, with the lower quartile of 26% 
and the upper quartile of 48%. It suggests that Chinese firms show concentrated ownership, 
and controlling shareholders in China have strong power over the listed firms. The average 
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cash flow rights are 31%, which is less than voting rights. The average ratio of controlling 
shareholders’ voting rights to cash flow rights is 1.56, and the median value is 1.01. It 
suggests that pyramid ownership structure exists in more than half of sample firms, which 
results in the disparity between voting rights and cash flow rights. 
As for the corporate governance variables, the average block shareholding is 9%, which 
is much smaller than the ownership of controlling shareholders. Independent directors 
represent 56% of board members on average. 8% of publicly listed firms in the sample are 
audited by the big four accounting companies. Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the correlation 
matrix for the independent variables. The correlation coefficients are relatively small, and 
there are not severe multicollinearity concerns. 
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
3.4.2 The effectiveness of corporate governance 
We test the effectiveness of corporate governance by regressing the crisis period stock 
return on the control-ownership disparity and corporate governance. The results are reported 
in column 1 of Table 3.3. The coefficient estimate of control-ownership disparity (voting 
rights / cash flow rights) is -0.022, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. It 
indicates that a greater separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is associated with 
lower stock return during the crisis. As we discussed in the theoretical section, a controlling 
shareholder’s expropriation ultimately reflects on stock return. Therefore, the negative 
coefficient estimate suggests that the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights 
stimulates controlling shareholders’ expropriation during the crisis. With the 
control-ownership disparity increasing by one standard deviation (1.19), the annualized crisis 
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period stock return decreases by 2.62% (i.e., 1.19× 0.022), which is economically 
significant.  
Column 1 of Table 3.3 also reports the coefficient estimates of corporate governance 
variables. The coefficient estimates of block shareholding and big four auditing are positive, 
but they are not statistically significant. The coefficient estimate of board independence is 
negative and not statistically significant. The above results indicate that corporate governance 
does not show significant influence on the stock return during the crisis. It could be due to 
that different firms are heterogeneously exposed to the credit crunch shock during the crisis. 
It makes the effectiveness of corporate governance varies across different firms. We will test 
this explanation in the next section. 
We also examine the effectiveness of corporate governance before and after the financial 
crisis. The results are reported in column 2 and 3 of Table 3.3. In contrast to the results during 
the crisis, the control-ownership disparity does not show significant influence on stock return 
either before or after the crisis. It suggests that there are not significant expropriation 
concerns in the absence of a crisis, which is consistent with our prediction. Similarly, the 
coefficient estimates of corporate governance are also not statistically significant. We further 
employ Chow test to compare the coefficient estimates in different periods. The 2χ statistics 
are statistically significant with the p-value of 0.00, which indicates the coefficient estimates 
during the crisis are significantly different from that of before or after the crisis. 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
3.4.3 Heterogeneous credit crunch shock and the effectiveness of corporate governance 
In the theoretical section, we predict that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
increases with the severity of credit crunch shock. We test the moderating role of 
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heterogeneous credit crunch shock by introducing the interaction between corporate 
governance and external finance dependence. With a firm depending more on external 
finance, it is exposed to severer credit crunch shock during the crisis. Therefore, we expect 
that corporate governance would be more effective in improving firm performance with a 
firm depending more on external finance. 
The estimation results are reported in column 1 of Table 3.4. The coefficient estimate of 
external finance dependence (Dependence) is -7.957, which indicates the firms that depend 
more on external finance are exposed to severer credit crunch shock during the crisis. The 
coefficient estimate of interaction between control-ownership disparity (Voting rights / Cash 
flow rights) and external finance dependence (Dependence) is -0.484, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. It suggests that, with a firm being exposed to severer credit crunch 
shock, separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is more likely to induce controlling 
shareholders’ expropriation behavior. Hence the negative association between 
control-ownership disparity and crisis period stock return is stronger. 
The coefficient estimates of interactions between external finance dependence 
(Dependence) and corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., Block shareholding, board 
independence, and big four auditing) are positive, and they are statistically significant at the 1% 
or 5% level. The positive coefficients imply that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
increases with the severity of credit crunch shock, which is consistent with our prediction. 
When a firm relies more on external finance and hence is exposed to severer credit crunch 
shock, corporate governance is more effective in deterring expropriation and improving firm 
performance.  
The above findings can also partially explain why corporate governance mechanisms do 
not show significant influence on crisis period stock return in column1 of Table 3.3. Since 
different firms could heterogeneously suffer from credit crunch shock during the crisis, 
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controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentive vary across firms. For the firms that suffer 
less from the crisis, corporate governance could not significantly improve firm performance. 
Therefore, we cannot observe significant coefficient estimates if we do not differentiate a 
firm’s exposure to the credit crunch shock.  
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
We also predict that controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights play an important role in 
the effectiveness of corporate governance. When a controlling shareholder holds more cash 
flow rights of a listed firm, the controlling shareholder’s payoff is more likely to be 
influenced by adverse shock. Therefore, the controlling shareholder has higher expropriation 
incentive, and hence the moderating role of heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance is stronger. 
We do subsample analysis by partitioning the total sample based on controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights. The results are reported in column 2 and 3 of Table 3.4. When 
a controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights are greater than 50%, the coefficient estimate of 
interaction between control-ownership disparity (Voting rights / Cash flow rights) and 
external finance dependence (Dependence) is -56.43, which is statistically significant at the 
10% level. In contrast, the corresponding coefficient estimate is not statistically significant 
when a controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights are less than 50%. The above findings 
suggest that, when a controlling shareholder holds higher cash flow rights, heterogeneous 
credit crunch shock more likely to induce controlling shareholders’ expropriation and hence 
moderate the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Corporate governance variables also show similar pattern across subsamples. In the 
higher cash flow rights subsample, the coefficient estimates of Block shareholding × 
Dependence and Board independence × Dependence are 68.47 and 39.42, respectively. Both 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Whereas the coefficient 
 110 
estimate of Block shareholding × Dependence is not statistically significant in the lower cash 
flow rights subsample. The coefficient estimate of Block shareholding × Dependence is 
statistically significant in the lower cash flow rights subsample, but the magnitude is much 
smaller. The exception is the coefficient estimate of Big four auditing × Dependence, which 
is only statistically significant in the lower cash flow rights subsample.  
It is worth to note that, the exact threshold of cash flow rights for subsamples is difficult 
to determine solely based on the theoretical model. To check robustness, we employ the cash 
flow rights of 45%, 35%, and 25% as alternative threshold points for subsamples. The results 
are reported in Table 3.5. In general, the coefficient estimates of interaction between 
corporate governance and external finance dependence are statistically significant in the 
higher cash flow rights subsamples (i.e., even columns). Whereas, the coefficient estimates in 
the lower cash flow rights subsample (i.e., odd columns) are either statistically insignificant 
or much smaller in magnitude.  
We further use Chow test to compare the coefficient estimates across subsamples. All 
the 2χ statistics are significantly different from zero with the p-value of 0.00. It indicates that 
the coefficient estimates of higher cash flow rights subsample are significantly different from 
that of lower cash flow rights subsample. The above finding is consistent with our prediction, 
and it indicates that cash flow rights affect controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentive 
and hence impact the effectiveness of corporate governance under the heterogeneous credit 
crunch shock.  
[Insert Table 3.5 about here] 
Overall, our findings suggest that heterogeneous adverse shock could moderate the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. With a firm being exposed to severer credit crunch 
shock, corporate governance is more effective in deterring expropriation and improving firm 
performance. It could potentially explain why previous literature documents mixed findings 
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on the effectiveness of corporate governance. Since different firms could be heterogeneously 
influenced by an adverse shock, it is difficult to examine the effectiveness of corporate 
governance if neglecting firms’ heterogeneous exposure to the shock. 
3.4.4 Alternative crisis period 
China government announced a massive economic stimulus program in November 2008 
(Liang, 2010; Overholt, 2010). Considering the possible distortion caused by government 
intervention, we set the period between May 2008 and November 2008 as an alternative crisis 
period. We calculate the annualized abnormal return based on the alternative crisis period. 
The descriptive statistics are report in Table 3.2. The average annualized stock return is 0.05, 
and the median value is 0.14, which is greater than the value in the main crisis period. 
We run regression based on the alternative crisis period, and the results are reported in 
Table 3.6. The estimation results are similar to that of main crisis period (i.e., May 2008 – 
February 2009). Column 1 reports the effectiveness of corporate governance during the 
alternative crisis period. The coefficient estimates of control-ownership disparity and 
corporate governance are consistent with our expectation, but they are not statistically 
significant. Column 2 shows the impact of heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. The coefficient estimates of interaction between 
corporate governance variables and external finance dependence are positive and statistically 
significant. It suggests that corporate governance become more effective in deterring 
expropriation with a firm being exposed to severer credit crunch shock. 
We also employ subsample analysis to examine the role of controlling shareholders’ 
cash flow rights. The thresholds of cash flow rights we use are the same as before. As shown 
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in column 3 to 10, the coefficient estimates of interaction between corporate governance and 
external finance dependence are more likely to be significant in the subsamples with higher 
cash flow rights (i.e., even columns). The above findings are similar to what we find in the 
main tests, and it indicates that our results are not distorted by China government’s economic 
stimulus program during the crisis. 
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
We also compare our crisis period with previous literature. Since it takes time for the 
crisis to affect China, and we focus on the period when the global financial crisis have 
significant influence in Chinese economy, thus the crisis period we define is later than what 
defined in prior literature. For instance, Tong and Wei (2008) examine the influence of 
subprime crisis on the U.S. economy. They set the crisis period as between August 2007 and 
March 2008. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012) investigate the financial crisis 
based on the international background. The crisis periods they define cover longer periods. 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) set the crisis period as between July 2007 and December 2008, 
while Erkens et al. (2012) set it as between January 2007 and September 2008.  
Although China economy experienced fluctuations before May 2008, it did not show 
significant collapse. Therefore, we predict the effectiveness of corporate governance in China 
is not significant in the crisis periods that are defined in previous literature. We use the stock 
return based on the crisis periods in previous literature as dependent variable to run the 
regression. We also calculate the return between October 2007 and April 2008, during which 
Chinese economy shows fluctuations. In the untabulated results, control-ownership disparity 
and corporate governance do not show significant influence on stock return. The 
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heterogeneous credit crunch shock does not show moderating role in the effectiveness of 
corporate governance either.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we theoretically and empirically examine the moderating role of 
heterogeneous adverse external shock in the effectiveness of corporate governance. We 
theoretically show that a controlling shareholder has high incentive to expropriate minority 
shareholders under an adverse external shock. With a firm being exposed to severer external 
shock, the controlling shareholders' expropriation incentive is higher. Therefore, shareholder 
protecting governance mechanisms would be more effective on deterring expropriation and 
improving firm performance in those periods with significant adverse external shock. 
We test the above hypotheses using Chinese nonfinancial firms during the recent global 
financial crisis. Most Chinese firms show concentrated ownership, and are controlled by 
controlling shareholders, which is consistent with our theoretical setting. We find that 
separation of controlling shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights is negatively 
associated with firms’ crisis period stock return. However, corporate governance is not 
effective in improving stock return in the level regression. We further show that, 
heterogeneous credit crunch shock could moderate the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
When a firm suffers more from the credit crunch shock, corporate governance is more 
effective in deterring expropriation and improving firm performance. Furthermore, the above 
is more likely to occur when a controlling shareholder has higher cash flow rights and more 
sensitive to the external shock. Taken together, our evidence suggests that corporate 
governance is more likely to play a role when a firm is exposed to a severer external shock. 
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Appendix 3. A: 
 
Variables Definitions 
Abnormal return (AR) The firm-level abnormal return during the global financial crisis. The crisis period is 
defined as the period from May 2008 to February 2009. We use the Fama-French 
three factors model to adjust the systematic risks (Fama and French, 1993). 
Abnormal return is calculated based on daily observations. To facilitate interpreting 
the regression coefficients, we use annualized abnormal return as the dependent 
variable. 
Abnormal return (AR) 
(alternative) 
The firm-level abnormal return based on an alternative crisis period. In November 
2008, China government announced the economic stimulus plan, so we define the 
period between May 2008 and November 2008 as the alternative crisis period. The 
Fama-French three factors model is employed to adjust the systematic risks, and 
annualized abnormal return is calculated as the dependent variable. 
External finance 
dependence 
An industry's dependence on the external finance prior to the global financial crisis. 
It is calculated as the ratio of an industry’s external finance to total investments in 
2006 and 2007. The industry is based on the 2-digit China National Economic 
Industry Classification (GB2002), and the data of external finance dependence is 
from the China Fixed Asset Investment Yearbook. 
  
Corporate governance  
Voting rights / Cash flow 
rights (or control 
ownership disparity) 
The ratio of a controlling shareholder's voting rights to cash flow rights. The 
controlling shareholder’s voting rights are its minimum ownership along the control 
chain. The cash flow rights are the shares of payoff that the controlling shareholder 
receives from the listed firm. It can be calculated as the product of the controlling 
shareholder's ownership along the control chain. We manually collect the control 
chains from each firm’s annual report in fiscal year 2007. 
Block shareholding Total shareholding of all the block shareholders excluding the controlling 
shareholder. A shareholder is classified as a block shareholder if it holds at least 5% 
shares of the listed firm. We take the observations at the end of fiscal year 2007. 
Board independence The percentage of independent directors on the board based on the observations at 
the end of fiscal year 2007. 
Big four auditing Indicator variable for the big four accounting companies. It takes the value of one if 
a firm is audited by the big four accounting companies in fiscal year 2007, and zero 
otherwise. 
  
Control variables  
Size The natural log of total revenue at the end of fiscal year 2007. 
Market-to-book The ratio of the market value of the tradable equity to the book value of total equity. 
It is based on the observations at the end of fiscal year 2007. 
Leverage The percentage of total liability in total assets at the end of fiscal year 2007. 
Intangible assets The percentage of intangible assets in total assets at the end of fiscal year 2007. 
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Figure 3.1: Loan growth rate in China during the global financial crisis 
This figure shows the growth rate of short-term loan and long-term loan in China around the global financial 
crisis. We collect the data from the RESSET database.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Chinese economy during the global financial crisis 
This figure shows the evolution of Chinese economy around the global financial crisis. The macroeconomic 
indicators include industrial production growth rate, export growth rate, and consumer confidence index. Based 
on the macroeconomic evolution, the crisis period is defined as between May 2008 and February 2009. The data 
is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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Figure 3.3: Stock markets around the world during the global financial crisis 
This picture demonstrates the stock market indices around the world during the global financial crisis. DJones 
denotes the S&P Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, Nikkei225 denotes the Nikkei Stock Average 225 Index, 
which is based on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, FTSE100 denotes the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index, 
and HS300 denotes the China Shanghai & Shenzhen 300 Stock Index. The crisis period is defined as between 
May 2008 and February 2009. To facilitate illustration, we standardize the value of indices at the beginning of 
the crisis (i.e., May 2008) to 100. The data is from the RESSET database. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Cumulative excess return of the low / high external finance dependence group 
This figure demonstrates the cumulative excess return during the global financial crisis for the low / high 
external finance dependence group. The crisis period is defined as between May 2008 and February 2009. The 
low and high dependence groups are based on the lower and upper tertiles of external finance dependence, 
respectively. The excess return of each portfolio is calculated as the equally weighted average return excluding 
the market return. The excess return that is calculated based on the value weighting method shows similar 
pattern.
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Figure 3.5: The control chain of a publicly listed firm in China 
This figure shows one example of the control chain in a publicly listed firm in China. The publicly listed firm is 
the Sichuan New Hope Agricultural Co., Ltd., and it is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China with 
stock code 000876. The ultimate controlling shareholder is Mr. Yonghao LIU. The above control chain is 
collected from the firm’s annual report in fiscal year 2007. 
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Table 3.1: Heterogeneous credit crunch shock 
 
Panel A: Abnormal return (AR) in the low / high external finance dependence group 
 N Average AR Difference of AR T-Test Wilcoxon Test 
Low dependence 296 0.12 
0.20  2.66(0.01) 2.98(0.00) 
High dependence 295 -0.08 
Panel B: Corporate governance in the low / high external finance dependence group 
 Low dependence High dependence T-Test Wilcoxon Test 
Voting rights / Cash flow rights 1.62  1.52  0.97(0.33 ) 0.04(0.97) 
Block shareholding 0.10  0.09  0.80(0.42) 0.70(0.48) 
Board independence 0.56  0.56  0.70(0.48) 0.65(0.51) 
Big four auditing 0.08  0.08  -0.01(0.99) -0.01(0.99) 
This table demonstrates the heterogeneous credit crunch shock by comparing abnormal return and corporate 
governance in the low / high external finance dependence group. External finance dependence measures an 
industry’s dependence on external finance prior to the global financial crisis (i.e., 2006 and 2007). Based on the 
sample median value of external finance dependence, we partition the total sample into the low dependence 
group and high dependence group. Panel A reports abnormal return in the low / high external finance 
dependence group. Abnormal return (AR) is the firm-level abnormal return during the global financial crisis 
(May 2008 – February 2009). The Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1993) is used to adjust 
the systematic risk. We annualize abnormal return to facilitate interpretation. Panel B reports the 
control-ownership disparity and corporate governance in the low / high external finance dependence group. 
Voting rights / Cash flow rights (or control-ownership disparity) is measured as the ratio of a controlling 
shareholder’s voting rights to its cash flow rights. Block shareholding is the total shareholding of all the block 
shareholders excluding the controlling shareholder. Board independence is calculated as the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. Big four auditing is the dummy variable for the big four accounting 
companies. Appendix A contains all variable definitions. We compare abnormal return and corporate 
governance based on T-Test and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The null hypothesis is that the two 
sets of observations in the low / high external finance dependence group are not significantly different from each 
other. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Univariate statistics        
  N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Abnormal return (AR) 625 0.02  0.92  -0.28  0.01  0.33  
Abnormal return (AR) (alternative) 625 0.05  1.67  -0.27  0.14  0.55  
External finance dependence 591 0.21  0.10  0.14  0.18  0.26  
Voting rights / Cash flow rights 625 1.56  1.19  1.00  1.01  1.74  
Voting rights 625 0.38  0.14  0.26  0.37  0.48  
Cash flow rights 625 0.31  0.16  0.19  0.28  0.42  
Block shareholding 625 0.09  0.12  0.00  0.05  0.18  
Board independence 625 0.56  0.12  0.50  0.50  0.60  
Big four auditing 625 0.08  0.27  0  0  0  
Size 625 21.30  1.28  20.44  21.18  22.03  
Market-to-book 625 2.96  2.06  1.63  2.36  3.65  
Leverage 625 0.49  0.16  0.37  0.50  0.62  
Intangible assets 625 0.04  0.05  0.01  0.03  0.06  
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Voting rights / Cash flow rights (I)  0.07  -0.05  0.01  -0.07  0.04  -0.01  0.05  
Block shareholding (II) 0.08   0.04  0.15  -0.09  -0.02  -0.04  0.09  
Board independence (III) -0.06  0.01   -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.06  -0.02  
Big four auditing (IV) -0.02  0.22  -0.05   0.32  -0.25  0.03  -0.01  
Size (V) -0.09  -0.02  -0.05  0.39   -0.25  0.35  -0.21  
Market-to-book (VI) 0.03  -0.02  0.00  -0.19  -0.22   0.04  0.11  
Leverage (VII) -0.04  -0.04  -0.08  0.04  0.33  0.02   -0.03  
Intangible assets (VIII) -0.01  0.07  -0.02  -0.04  -0.26  0.05  -0.03   
This table presents the summary statistics for main variables of interests. Panel A reports the univariate statistics. 
Panel B reports the correlation matrix for independent variables. The upper triangle is based on the Spearman 
correlation, and the lower triangle is based on the Pearson correlation. The dependent variable abnormal return 
(AR) is firm-level abnormal return during the global financial crisis (May 2008 – February 2009). Abnormal 
return (AR) (alternative) is firm-level abnormal return based on an alternative crisis period (May 2008 - 
November 2008). We calculate abnormal return based on the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 
1993). To facilitate interpretation, we use annualized abnormal return in the regression. External finance 
dependence measures an industry’s dependence on external finance prior to the financial crisis (i.e., 2006 and 
2007). The data on external finance dependence is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, and the 
industries are based on the 2-digit China National Economic Industry Classification (GB2002). Voting rights / 
Cash flow rights (or control-ownership disparity) is measured as the ratio of a controlling shareholder’s voting 
rights to its cash flow rights. Block shareholding is the total shareholding of all the block shareholders excluding 
the controlling shareholder. Board independence is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Big 
four auditing is the dummy variable for the big four accounting companies. Size is the natural log of total 
revenue. Market to book is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Leverage is the 
percentage of total liability in total assets. Intangible assets measures the percentage of intangible assets in total 
assets. Appendix A contains all variable definitions. All the independent variables are based on the observations 
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at the end of fiscal year 2007. We winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
 121 
Table 3.3: The effectiveness of corporate governance during, before, and after the global financial crisis 
 
 During the crisis Before the crisis After the crisis 
 May 2008 - Feb 2009 May 2007 - Feb 2008 May 2009 - Feb 2010 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Voting rights / Cash flow rights -0.022* 0.035 -0.006 
 (-1.92) (1.07) (-1.32) 
Block shareholding 0.382 -0.196 0.159 
 (1.35) (-1.02) (1.24) 
Board independence -0.347 0.031 -0.016 
 (-1.13) (0.15) (-0.10) 
Big four auditing 0.160 0.024 -0.172** 
 (1.07) (0.27) (-2.48) 
Size -0.091 0.029 0.038 
 (-1.69) (0.97) (1.57) 
Market-to-book 0.001 0.031** -0.013 
 (0.07) (2.45) (-1.08) 
Leverage 0.316 0.282* -0.132 
 (0.77) (1.91) (-1.43) 
Intangible assets -1.037* -0.049 0.143 
 (-1.95) (-0.10) (0.43) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 625 636 693 
R-squared 0.055 0.136 0.062 
Chi2 (P-value)   770.29(0.00) 1474.83(0.00) 
This table presents the effectiveness of corporate governance during, before, and after the global financial crisis. 
Column 1 uses the firm-level abnormal return during the global financial crisis as dependent variable. The crisis 
period is defined as between May 2008 and February 2009. Independent variables are based on the observations 
at the end of fiscal year 2007. Appendix A contains all variable definitions. Column 2 and 3 use the firm-level 
abnormal return before and after the crisis as dependent variable, respectively. The period before the crisis is set 
as between May 2007 and February 2008, and the period after the crisis is set as between May 2009 and 
February 2010. Independent variables in column 2 and 3 are based on the observations at the end of fiscal year 
2006 and 2008, respectively. We use Chow test to compare the regression coefficients before (after) the crisis 
with crisis period coefficients. Chi2 statistics and p-value are reported in the last row of column 2 and 3. 
Industry fixed effects based on the 2-digit industry classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) are used in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at industry levels, T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneous credit crunch shock and the effectiveness of corporate governance during the 
crisis 
 
 
Total sample 
Subsamples 
 Cash flow rights 
 <50% ≥50% 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
(Voting rights / Cash flow rights) × Dependence -0.484** -0.234 -56.430* 
 (-2.13) (-1.53) (-1.80) 
Block shareholding × Dependence 5.935*** -1.003 68.470*** 
 (4.29) (-0.60) (4.05) 
Board independence × Dependence 7.815*** 1.691** 39.420*** 
 (7.02) (2.59) (5.05) 
Big four auditing × Dependence 1.683** 0.922* -5.015 
 (2.70) (1.85) (-0.15) 
Dependence -7.957*** -2.160* 27.030 
 (-6.57) (-2.02) (1.00) 
Voting rights / Cash flow rights -0.107** 0.010 9.697 
 (-2.29) (0.28) (1.70) 
Block shareholding -0.820* 0.258 -11.250*** 
 (-1.77) (0.47) (-3.11) 
Board independence -2.020*** -0.958*** -7.980*** 
 (-9.10) (-4.73) (-4.38) 
Big four auditing -0.184* -0.127 1.370 
 (-2.00) (-0.94) (0.23) 
Size -0.095 -0.026 -0.317 
 (-1.63) (-1.05) (-1.27) 
Market-to-book 0.002 0.006 -0.068 
 (0.15) (0.39) (-1.11) 
Leverage 0.426 0.079 0.985 
 (1.01) (0.45) (0.48) 
Intangible assets -1.257** -1.231* -2.136 
 (-2.07) (-1.84) (-1.56) 
Constant 4.156*** 1.994*** 3.065 
 (3.38) (2.93) (0.58) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 591 503 88 
R-squared 0.087 0.130 0.229 
Chi2 (P-value)   2418.72(0.00) 
This table presents the moderating role of heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance during the crisis. The dependent variable is firm-level abnormal return during the global financial 
crisis. The crisis period is defined as between May 2008 and February 2009. Independent variables are based on 
the observations at the end of fiscal year 2007. Dependence denotes an industry’s external finance dependence, 
and it measures the extent of heterogeneous credit crunch shock. A higher level of dependence on external 
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finance implies severer credit crunch shock during the global financial crisis. The variables of interests are the 
interaction between corporate governance and external finance dependence. Column 1 is based on the total 
sample. Column 2 and 3 use the subsamples that are partitioned by controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights. 
Column 2 corresponds to the subsample in which controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are less than 50%, 
while column 3 corresponds to the subsample in which controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are equal to or 
higher than 50%. We employ Chow test to compare the regression coefficients in the subsamples in column 2 
and 3, the Chi2 statistics and p-value are reported in the last row. Appendix A contains all variable definitions. 
Industry fixed effects based on the 2-digit industry classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) are used in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at industry levels, T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Subsample analysis based on cash flow rights 
 
 
Subsamples   Subsamples   Subsamples 
 
Cash flow rights 
 
Cash flow rights 
 
Cash flow rights 
 
<45% ≥45%  <35% ≥35%  <25% ≥25% 
Independent variables (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
(Voting rights / Cash flow rights)  -0.289* 9.861 
 
-0.022 8.905** 
 
-0.029 2.316 
× Dependence (-1.71) (1.12) 
 
(-0.15) (2.15) 
 
(-0.15) (1.55) 
Block shareholding × Dependence -0.829 18.740*** 2.485 13.340*** 5.662 6.268*** 
 (-0.39) (6.19) 
 
(1.12) (5.72) 
 
(1.45) (3.28) 
Board independence × Dependence 1.224* 27.980*** 2.403*** 20.960*** 2.502 9.106*** 
 (1.81) (5.74) 
 
(3.19) (5.14) 
 
(1.61) (10.26) 
Big four auditing × Dependence 0.344 1.290 
 
-0.619 2.445** 
 
-3.007* 2.004*** 
 (0.63) (0.58) 
 
(-0.89) (2.49) 
 
(-1.95) (3.69) 
Dependence -1.502 -31.440** 
 
-3.034** -25.550*** -4.473*** -10.720*** 
 (-1.31) (-2.66) 
 
(-2.49) (-3.98) 
 
(-2.85) (-4.62) 
Voting rights / Cash flow rights 0.022 -3.070 
 
-0.033 -2.077** 
 
-0.027 -0.367 
 (0.55) (-1.30) 
 
(-0.96) (-2.24) 
 
(-0.69) (-0.96) 
Block shareholding 0.322 -3.323** 
 
-0.283 -2.175** 
 
-1.006 -0.771 
 (0.52) (-2.81) 
 
(-0.55) (-2.72) 
 
(-1.47) (-1.19) 
Board independence -0.814*** -5.657*** 
 
-1.056*** -4.208*** -1.041*** -2.307*** 
 (-4.25) (-5.77) 
 
(-4.87) (-4.81) 
 
(-3.14) (-7.00) 
Big four auditing -0.138 0.602 
 
0.064 -0.153 
 
0.544 -0.179 
 (-1.13) (0.67) 
 
(0.50) (-0.46) 
 
(1.68) (-0.97) 
Size -0.023 -0.281 
 
-0.009 -0.161* 
 
-0.001 -0.144* 
 (-1.03) (-1.46) 
 
(-0.34) (-1.78) 
 
(-0.04) (-1.82) 
Market-to-book 0.002 -0.035 
 
0.003 0.007 
 
-0.000 0.005 
 (0.11) (-0.68) 
 
(0.24) (0.25) 
 
(-0.02) (0.23) 
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Leverage 0.079 1.122 
 
0.180 0.542 
 
0.176 0.548 
 (0.51) (0.73) 
 
(0.96) (0.55) 
 
(0.64) (0.78) 
Intangible assets -0.981* -1.359 
 
-0.709 -1.684** 
 
-0.652 -1.622** 
 
(-1.96) (-1.44) 
 
(-1.35) (-2.38) 
 
(-0.80) (-2.36) 
Constant 1.657** 13.730** 
 
1.592** 9.346*** 
 
2.005** 5.547*** 
 
(2.49) (2.34) 
 
(2.15) (3.38) 
 
(2.30) (3.03) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 467 124 
 
373 218 
 
249 342 
R-squared 0.119 0.181 
 
0.145 0.110 
 
0.201 0.082 
Chi2 (P-value) 4978.95 (0.00)   1691.55 (0.00)   621.88 (0.00) 
This table presents the moderating role of heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the effectiveness of corporate governance across different subsamples. Column 1 and 2 use 
the cash flow rights of 45% as threshold to partition subsamples. Column 1 corresponds to the subsample where controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are less than 45%, 
and column 2 corresponds to the subsample where controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are equal to or higher than 45%. Similarly, column 3 and 4 use the cash flow 
rights of 35% as threshold, column 5 and 6 use the cash flow rights of 25% as threshold. Dependent variable is firm-level abnormal return during the global financial crisis, 
and the crisis period is defined as between May 2008 and February 2009. The independent variables are based on the observations at the end of fiscal year 2007. Dependence 
denotes an industry’s external finance dependence, and it measures the extent of heterogeneous credit crunch shock. Appendix A contains all variables definitions. We use 
Chow test to compare the regression results of subsamples, the Chi2 statistics and p-value are reported in the last row. Industry fixed effects based on the 2-digit industry 
classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are used in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at industry levels, T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.6: Alternative crisis period 
 
  
Total sample 
Subsamples   Subsamples   Subsamples   Subsamples 
 Cash flow rights  Cash flow rights 
 
Cash flow rights 
 
Cash flow rights 
 <50% ≥50%  <45% ≥45% 
 
<35% ≥35% 
 
<25% ≥25% 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
(Voting rights / Cash flow rights)   0.604 -0.324 -66.010 
 
-0.428 2.252 
 
0.118 6.263 
 
0.004 1.255 
× Dependence  (1.36) (-0.72) (-1.47) 
 
(-0.89) (0.17) 
 
(0.46) (0.88) 
 
(0.01) (0.42) 
Block shareholding × Dependence  6.670** -1.695 78.030*** -1.667 21.890*** 4.743 13.000** 
 
9.285*** 5.548 
  (2.20) (-0.51) (4.06) 
 
(-0.41) (3.12) 
 
(1.61) (2.11) 
 
(2.93) (1.35) 
Board independence × Dependence  7.211*** 1.066 37.800*** 0.263 24.220*** 1.693 17.950*** 1.783 8.001*** 
  (6.20) (0.65) (6.62) 
 
(0.14) (5.34) 
 
(1.51) (4.04) 
 
(1.07) (5.09) 
Big four auditing × Dependence  1.959*** 1.633*** -16.090 
 
0.636 2.164 
 
-0.874 3.447* 
 
-3.869 2.385** 
  (2.95) (2.76) (-0.30) 
 
(0.85) (0.65) 
 
(-1.09) (1.85) 
 
(-1.22) (2.72) 
Dependence  -8.604*** -2.707 47.710 
 
-1.417 -17.710 
 
-4.142** -18.430** -5.585** -8.707** 
  (-4.78) (-1.21) (1.10) 
 
(-0.58) (-1.07) 
 
(-2.32) (-2.16) 
 
(-2.57) (-2.16) 
Voting rights / Cash flow rights -0.003 -0.108 0.035 14.680 
 
0.056 -1.012 
 
-0.068 -1.572 
 
-0.037 0.009 
 (-0.13) (-1.17) (0.34) (1.46) 
 
(0.51) (-0.25) 
 
(-1.13) (-0.97) 
 
(-0.53) (0.01) 
Block shareholding 0.741 -0.614 0.716 -13.970** 0.723 -3.477 
 
-0.685 -1.319 
 
-1.513** -0.251 
 (1.57) (-0.62) (0.63) (-2.54) 
 
(0.56) (-1.19) 
 
(-1.02) (-0.55) 
 
(-2.24) (-0.17) 
Board independence -0.203 -1.722*** -0.805 -6.199*** -0.571 -3.881*** -0.917*** -2.579* 
 
-0.848** -1.822*** 
 (-0.70) (-4.96) (-1.62) (-3.52) 
 
(-1.15) (-3.29) 
 
(-2.88) (-1.82) 
 
(-2.09) (-3.00) 
Big four auditing 0.204 -0.206 -0.333* 3.966 
 
-0.216 0.715 
 
-0.001 -0.173 
 
0.498 -0.110 
 (1.13) (-1.25) (-1.75) (0.43) 
 
(-1.00) (0.56) 
 
(-0.01) (-0.28) 
 
(0.82) (-0.35) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 625 591 503 88 
 
467 124 
 
373 218 
 
249 342 
R-squared 0.037 0.048 0.070 0.153 
 
0.063 0.127 
 
0.123 0.069 
 
0.171 0.048 
Chi2 (P-value)     3852.69(0.00)   1969.87(0.00)   1812.69(0.00)   482.31(0.00) 
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This table presents the influence of heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the effectiveness of corporate governance based on an alternative crisis period. The alternative crisis 
period is defined as between May 2008 and November 2008. In November 2008, China government announced its economic stimulus program. Dependent variable is firm 
level abnormal return based on the alternative crisis period. The independent variables are based on the observations at the end of fiscal year 2007. Column 1 and 2 use total 
sample. Column 3 to 10 use subsamples that are partitioned by controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights. Four thresholds of cash flow rights are used, and they are 50%, 
45%, 35%, and 25%. The odd (even) columns correspond to subsamples with lower (higher) cash flow rights. We use Chow test to compare the regression results across 
different subsamples. The Chi2 statistic and p-value are reported in the last row. Dependence denotes external finance dependence, and it measures the extent of 
heterogeneous credit crunch shock. A higher level of dependence on external finance implies severer credit crunch shock during the crisis. Appendix A contains all variables 
definitions. Industry fixed effects based on the 2-digit industry classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are used in all specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at industry levels, T-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis covers three topics: accounting conservatism, corporate social responsibility, 
and corporate governance. In chapter one, I find that firms with less conservative financial 
reporting are more likely to use trade credit during the recent global financial crisis. It 
suggests that suppliers rely less on conservative financial reporting to evaluate customer 
firms. In chapter two, I document that suppliers’ preference on socially responsible customers. 
A customer with better social performance is more likely to receive trade credit from 
suppliers. In chapter three, I theoretically and empirically show the moderating role of a 
heterogeneous credit crunch shock on the effectiveness of corporate governance. When a firm 
is exposed to severer credit crunch shock, corporate governance is more likely to play a role 
in deterring expropriation and improving firm performance. 
 An interesting but unexplored question is the association between accounting 
conservatism and corporate social responsibility. It is unclear how corporate social 
responsibility is associated with accounting conservatism. On the one hand, socially 
responsible firms might rely less on accounting conservatism to obtain debt financing. On the 
other hand, socially responsible firms might be likely to conduct conservative financing 
reporting to be more transparent.  
Another interesting issue is the influence of credit crunch shock on the agency conflict 
between shareholders and management. In chapter three, we mainly focus on the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholder. However, the agency 
conflict between shareholders and management dominates in most development countries. A 
 129 
natural prediction is that a heterogeneous credit crunch shock could also moderate the agency 
conflict between shareholders and management. 
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